]> git.hungrycats.org Git - linux/commitdiff
fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Mon, 9 Oct 2017 19:46:18 +0000 (12:46 -0700)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 27 Oct 2017 08:23:18 +0000 (10:23 +0200)
commit d60b5b7854c3d135b869f74fb93eaf63cbb1991a upstream.

When an fscrypt-encrypted file is opened, we request the file's master
key from the keyrings service as a logon key, then access its payload.
However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for
this.  request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a
window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore.

Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was
already revoked at the time it was requested.

Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities")
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.1+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c

index 505f8afde57c769819c985ef7afbe177daabf5b2..9a1bc638abce76df87bf97ca54aa3924eb833e89 100644 (file)
@@ -204,6 +204,12 @@ int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
        }
        down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
        ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+       if (!ukp) {
+               /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+               res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+               up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+               goto out;
+       }
        if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key)) {
                res = -EINVAL;
                up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
index ae49be377b606063ab64a448e854df5742ad51f4..7e62889a1d3dd1b08d9f13123b43ac41f1f1c9e6 100644 (file)
@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@ int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
        }
        down_read(&keyring_key->sem);
        ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+       if (!ukp) {
+               /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
+               res = -EKEYREVOKED;
+               up_read(&keyring_key->sem);
+               goto out;
+       }
        if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) {
                res = -EINVAL;
                up_read(&keyring_key->sem);