[ Upstream commit
de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 ]
smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2
CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a
security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the
function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no
access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and
WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).
The empty-DACL branch only denies when both
- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)),
and
- the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0,
which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants
the full requested access. Three problems follow:
- The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit
rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those
rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For
READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to
inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of
an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.
- A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any
caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.
- A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes
(pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is
granted whatever was requested.
On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g.
"force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so
POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.
Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an
empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than
READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Aamir Ahmed <elb12345@hotmail.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
[ sashal: added missing ownership declarations and initialization of is_owner using the mount’s ID mapping ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
struct posix_acl_entry *pa_entry;
unsigned int sid_type = SIDOWNER;
unsigned short ace_size;
+ bool is_owner;
+ vfsuid_t vfsuid;
ksmbd_debug(SMB, "check permission using windows acl\n");
pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, idmap,
if (pdacl_size > acl_size || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl))
goto err_out;
+ if (!uid)
+ sid_type = SIDUNIX_USER;
+ id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid);
+ vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_inode(path->dentry));
+ is_owner = uid == from_kuid(&init_user_ns, vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid));
+
if (!pdacl->num_aces) {
- if (!(pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) &&
- *pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)) {
+ /*
+ * An empty (present, zero-ACE) DACL grants no access to
+ * anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL
+ * and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). Deny every other caller,
+ * deny the owner any access beyond those two bits, and do
+ * not let trailing bytes after a zero-ACE DACL become an
+ * implicit grant.
+ */
+ if (!is_owner ||
+ (*pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)))
rc = -EACCES;
- goto err_out;
- }
goto err_out;
}
- if (!uid)
- sid_type = SIDUNIX_USER;
- id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid);
-
if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE) {
access_bits = READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES |
DELETE;