knfsd: fix spurious EINVAL errors on first access of new filesystem

patch ac8587dcb58e40dd336d99d60f852041e06cc3dd in mainline.

The v2/v3 acl code in nfsd is translating any return from fh_verify() to
nfserr_inval.  This is particularly unfortunate in the case of an
nfserr_dropit return, which is an internal error meant to indicate to
callers that this request has been deferred and should just be dropped
pending the results of an upcall to mountd.

Thanks to Roland <devzero@web.de> for bug report and data collection.

Cc: Roland <devzero@web.de>
Acked-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Reviewed-By: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
index b6174288501112f4cef17b0d4349e88832da551a..0e5fa11e6b44c4fa114e5e48ef0408a4227a5c07 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_getacl(struct svc_rqst * rqstp,
 
        fh = fh_copy(&resp->fh, &argp->fh);
        if ((nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, &resp->fh, 0, MAY_NOP)))
-               RETURN_STATUS(nfserr_inval);
+               RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
 
        if (argp->mask & ~(NFS_ACL|NFS_ACLCNT|NFS_DFACL|NFS_DFACLCNT))
                RETURN_STATUS(nfserr_inval);

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
index 3e3f2de82c36bc4586789c79ca1a30aeb5272626..b647f2f872dcf60685bd03a1c5d3022b47bfb314 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static __be32 nfsd3_proc_getacl(struct svc_rqst * rqstp,
 
        fh = fh_copy(&resp->fh, &argp->fh);
        if ((nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, &resp->fh, 0, MAY_NOP)))
-               RETURN_STATUS(nfserr_inval);
+               RETURN_STATUS(nfserr);
 
        if (argp->mask & ~(NFS_ACL|NFS_ACLCNT|NFS_DFACL|NFS_DFACLCNT))
                RETURN_STATUS(nfserr_inval);