pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged users

commit 1c90308e7a77af6742a97d1021cca923b23b7f0d upstream.

This patch makes pagemap readable for normal users and hides physical
addresses from them.  For some use-cases PFN isn't required at all.

See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425935472-17949-1-git-send-email-kirill@shutemov.name

Fixes: ab676b7d6fbf ("pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2:
 - Add the same check in the places where we look up a PFN
 - Add struct pagemapread * parameters where necessary
 - Open-code file_ns_capable()
 - Delete pagemap_open() entirely, as it would always return 0]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
(cherry picked from commit b1fb185f26e85f76e3ac6ce557398d78797c9684)
[wt: adjusted context, no pagemap_hugetlb_range() in 2.6.32, needs
     cred argument to security_capable(), tested OK ]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>

diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index 73db5a6e42df1aae01a2cb408d259455942aa277..36c1edf4f1bc5e0fd25454cf01310dc1e0159873 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/mempolicy.h>
 #include <linux/swap.h>
 #include <linux/swapops.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/elf.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -539,6 +540,7 @@ const struct file_operations proc_clear_refs_operations = {
 
 struct pagemapread {
        u64 __user *out, *end;
+       bool show_pfn;
 };
 
 #define PM_ENTRY_BYTES      sizeof(u64)
@@ -589,14 +591,14 @@ static u64 swap_pte_to_pagemap_entry(pte_t pte)
        return swp_type(e) | (swp_offset(e) << MAX_SWAPFILES_SHIFT);
 }
 
-static u64 pte_to_pagemap_entry(pte_t pte)
+static u64 pte_to_pagemap_entry(struct pagemapread *pm, pte_t pte)
 {
        u64 pme = 0;
        if (is_swap_pte(pte))
                pme = PM_PFRAME(swap_pte_to_pagemap_entry(pte))
                        | PM_PSHIFT(PAGE_SHIFT) | PM_SWAP;
        else if (pte_present(pte))
-               pme = PM_PFRAME(pte_pfn(pte))
+               pme = (pm->show_pfn ? PM_PFRAME(pte_pfn(pte)) : 0)
                        | PM_PSHIFT(PAGE_SHIFT) | PM_PRESENT;
        return pme;
 }
@@ -624,7 +626,7 @@ static int pagemap_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
                if (vma && (vma->vm_start <= addr) &&
                    !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)) {
                        pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, addr);
-                       pfn = pte_to_pagemap_entry(*pte);
+                       pfn = pte_to_pagemap_entry(pm, *pte);
                        /* unmap before userspace copy */
                        pte_unmap(pte);
                }
@@ -695,6 +697,9 @@ static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
        if (!count)
                goto out_task;
 
+       /* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */
+       pm.show_pfn = !security_capable(file->f_cred, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+
        mm = get_task_mm(task);
        if (!mm)
                goto out_task;
@@ -773,19 +778,9 @@ out:
        return ret;
 }
 
-static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-       /* do not disclose physical addresses to unprivileged
-          userspace (closes a rowhammer attack vector) */
-       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-               return -EPERM;
-       return 0;
-}
-
 const struct file_operations proc_pagemap_operations = {
        .llseek         = mem_lseek, /* borrow this */
        .read           = pagemap_read,
-       .open           = pagemap_open,
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR */