From: Chuck Lever Date: Sat, 8 Aug 2026 15:40:10 +0000 (-0400) Subject: SUNRPC: Reject a TLS alert record that is not two octets X-Git-Tag: v6.18.61~94 X-Git-Url: http://git.hungrycats.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=560956c8d2479bbf3a215b94391d9ada2063206e;p=linux SUNRPC: Reject a TLS alert record that is not two octets commit d16bebe45272ced4f962d27b9efd8b32a3876bd9 upstream. tls_alert_recv() reads two octets from the kvec it is handed and does not check the length (net/handshake/alert.c). svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg() calls it for any positive receive, and the alert[] buffer it supplies carries no initializer. A one-octet alert body leaves the description read from uninitialized stack and reported through trace_tls_alert_recv(). The peer controls that length. Neither tls_rx_msg_size() nor tls_rx_one_record() enforces the two-octet Alert payload. A TLS 1.3 record carrying only the inner content-type octet decrypts to a zero-length payload. RFC 8446 Section 5.1 requires a record with an Alert type to carry exactly one message, so any other length is malformed. Require exactly two octets before parsing and return -EBADMSG otherwise. That closes the transport rather than acting on a partly uninitialized alert. Gate the path on a control message rather than a positive count so that a zero-length record reaches the check. Fixes: bee47cb026e7 ("sunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260808-svcsock-cmsg-fixes-v3-2-62d9a631c880@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c index ceb4d504409f4..51031450062f2 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c @@ -289,13 +289,23 @@ svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags) iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1, alert_kvec.iov_len); ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, MSG_DONTWAIT); - if (ret > 0) { + /* put_cmsg() shrinks msg_controllen, so a short one means + * kTLS filled in u.cmsg. + */ + if (ret >= 0 && msg.msg_controllen < sizeof(u)) { /* Returning the count would credit the RPC stream with * octets that never reached the caller's buffer. */ if (tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) return -EAGAIN; + /* An Alert record carries exactly one two-octet message + * (RFC 8446 Section 5.1). alert_kvec caps the receive at two, + * so a longer record produces the same count. MSG_EOR appears + * only once kTLS has drained the whole record. + */ + if (ret != sizeof(alert) || !(msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) + return -EBADMSG; iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret); ret = svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, &u.cmsg, -EAGAIN); }