btrfs: stripe_alloc: do not count trapped free space twice when making a block group read-only
inc_block_group_ro() refuses to make a data block group read-only
unless the other groups of the space_info have at least as much free
space as this group is withdrawing: a read-only group's free space
leaves the pool writers allocate from, data never overcommits, and the
check (sinfo_used + num_bytes <= total_bytes) keeps concurrent writers
from failing allocations they could otherwise have been placed in while
the group is read-only. Scrub takes the same path as balance, since
the space is demanded for those writers, not for moving data.
With stripe_alloc, the part of this group's free space that is trapped
in partially used stripes is already counted in btrfs_space_info_used()
through bytes_stripe_unusable, and it is also part of num_bytes, so the
check demands room elsewhere for those bytes twice -- although once the
group is read-only its trapped bytes leave the aggregate anyway, and
writers never had them to begin with. A fragmented raid56 data group
could therefore never be made read-only.
RAID56 groups must be read-only for scrub: scrub keeps its own copy of
the stripe, which a concurrent read-modify-write would corrupt, so
unlike other profiles it cannot proceed without the flag. On a
filesystem whose data groups had been churned (2.98 GiB group, 51%
used, 1.47 GiB of the remainder trapped) every device's scrub failed
with
BTRFS warning: scrub: failed setting block group ro: -28
while the same filesystem without stripe_alloc scrubbed at 100% used.
Device replace takes the same path. Freeing space made scrub work
again.
Subtract the group's own trapped bytes from the space it needs to find
elsewhere. The counter may lag the space_info total between commits;
the check is a buffer heuristic, and the bound by num_bytes keeps it
from going negative.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: drain the legacy allocator's writes before arming the write-hole check at a runtime enable
Enabling stripe_alloc on a live filesystem (the btrfs.stripe_alloc property)
flips the mount option while the legacy allocator may still have writes in
flight. Those extents sit in partly used stripes that no stripe run covers,
so the first of them to reach rmw_rbio() after the flip trips
btrfs_stripe_check_write()'s "write to stripe outside any live stripe run"
WARN_ONCE and taints the kernel, although nothing violated the policy: the
data was placed before the policy existed. punch-hole-warn-repro.sh hits it
on the switch when its killed writers still have dirty data (bhive, 7.3-rc2
lane, 2026-09-12); the same code on 6.18 escaped only by timing.
Keep the check off from the flip until every ordered extent that could have
been allocated before it has completed. The property is applied inside a
transaction, where flushing delalloc cannot wait, so the drain runs in a
worker: start delalloc on all roots, wait for all ordered extents, clear the
flag. Extents allocated after the flip have stripe runs and are unaffected;
a mount-time enable (the root directory's property) has nothing in flight and
does not queue the drain. close_ctree() flushes the worker so it cannot
outlive the filesystem.
Zygo Blaxell [Sun, 9 Aug 2026 22:05:48 +0000 (18:05 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_meta: allocate tree blocks by whole stripes
Metadata gets the placement rule data already has: tree blocks are handed
out from runs of fully free stripes, and a stripe is never revisited once
the transaction that filled it has written it. No separate mount option: the
chunk profile already decides it. raid56 metadata has the same write hole
as raid56 data, so it gets the same protection at the same time, and
metadata on any other profile has no write hole to close -- the policy's
RAID56_MASK test simply does not match it, so nothing changes there.
It does cost a stranded stripe tail per commit, and a metadata allocation
that fails aborts the transaction rather than failing one write. Those
are the price of covering raid56 metadata at all rather than a reason to
make it opt-in separately: a filesystem unwilling to pay them does not
want raid56 metadata, and converting it to raid1c3/raid1c4 removes both
the cost and the write hole.
Only system chunks are left uncovered: btrfs_is_stripe_meta_bg() tests the
METADATA flag and a system chunk does not carry it, so a raid56 system
chunk keeps the legacy read-modify-write. The mount-time warning is
narrowed to say exactly that instead of claiming metadata is uncovered,
which it no longer is.
The machinery is the data machinery, including the per-sector liveness
map the previous patch gave it. Metadata needed three things of its own:
- A completion report. A run drains when every byte allocated from it
has been accounted for, and metadata had no equivalent of ordered
extent completion, so its runs could never drain -- the deadlock that
mixed block groups hit. end_bbio_meta_write() now reports, and
btrfs_open_stripe_write_abandoned() covers a tree block freed before
it was ever written (COWed twice in one transaction, say).
- A two-phase closure. btrfs_retire_open_stripes() runs before the
commit writes tree blocks, so it skips metadata runs; they are closed
and drained afterwards by btrfs_retire_meta_stripes(), once every block
is on disk. Closing earlier would strand blocks the commit has not
allocated yet, draining earlier would wait for writes it has not
issued. Metadata runs are also freed there rather than when their
counter reaches zero: a stripe's columns can be written by separate
rbios, and freeing on the first completion leaves the second with no
run to pad or merge against.
- Whole stripes per writeback pass. The opportunistic writeback passes
do not know about stripes and will happily write three tree blocks now
and five later; btrfs_defer_stripe_meta_write() leaves the blocks
dirty for the commit (or a WB_SYNC_ALL waiter) instead, the same shape
as the zoned write-pointer deferral.
Two free paths bypass the usual completion reporting and must report the
block abandoned themselves: btrfs_free_tree_block() can send a
same-transaction unwritten block through the delayed-ref machinery when
check_ref_cleanup() finds its ref head already processed, and
clean_log_buffer() discards unwritten log tree blocks via
btrfs_pin_reserved_extent() without ever visiting btrfs_free_tree_block().
Either miss leaves the block counted as inflight forever: the run never
drains, the block group reference never drops, and unmount asserts. Both
were found by the dm-log-writes replay matrix, whose crash-recovery mounts
exercise both paths routinely.
Zygo Blaxell [Sun, 16 Aug 2026 07:54:18 +0000 (03:54 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: cache a failed stripe run scan per block group
On a large aged filesystem (85 TiB, mostly legacy pre-stripe_alloc data,
heavily fragmented free space), the delalloc workers spin at 100% CPU
while commits crawl at KiB/s. NMI backtraces put the time in
btrfs_claim_free_stripe_run() called from btrfs_alloc_from_open_stripe()
for every small compressed extent allocation.
The cost is in find_free_stripe_run_slow(): when the single-entry fast
path misses (always, on fragmented block groups), the slow path walks
candidate stripes from the START of the block group, doing an rbtree
lookup per free-space piece, all under ctl->tree_lock. When the block
group has no claimable run at all - the common case for block groups
filled with legacy data - the scan traverses the entire block group,
returns -ENOSPC, and remembers nothing: the next 4K allocation repeats
the whole scan. Per-allocation cost is O(block group size) in the
fragmented worst case, multiplied by every block group find_free_extent
visits.
The stock allocator avoids exactly this pathology by caching the largest
extent a failed search saw (max_extent_size); the stripe claim path is a
new search primitive built beside it and never inherited the idea. The
per-block-group stripe_claimable counter cannot serve this role: it is a
commit-scan-granular byte estimate that can err high (block groups where
the accounting promises claimable bytes but the scan finds no aligned,
usable run are precisely where the scan storm happens).
Add bg->max_claimable_run, an upper bound learned from the scans
themselves: (u64)-1 unknown, 0 after an exhaustive scan proved no
claimable run exists (find_free_stripe_run_slow() accepts any run of at
least one full stripe, so its failure is that proof). Claims fail in
O(1) while the bound is below one full stripe, or when total free space
in the block group is smaller than a full stripe. Adding free space
resets the bound to unknown in __btrfs_add_free_space(), which covers
all paths that can create a run: frees, unpins, and stripe run returns.
The bound is only trusted and only set once the block group is fully
cached, because cache loading links entries directly and would bypass
the reset.
Zygo Blaxell [Fri, 14 Aug 2026 01:12:02 +0000 (21:12 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: gate data admission on claimable whole-stripe supply
Wire stripe_claimable into the DATA reservation path so write() returns -ENOSPC
when there is no fully-free whole stripe to place the write crash-safely --
matching statfs f_bavail, which already subtracts the trapped partial-stripe
space. Add stripe_claimable_admit() and AND it into the two data-admit sites:
__reserve_bytes() and btrfs_try_granting_tickets() (the latter is required, or a
flushed data ticket would be granted by the plain used<=total rule, bypassing the
gate). Scoped to raid56 stripe_alloc DATA (stripe_margin_unit != 0); metadata,
non-raid56 and zoned space_infos are unaffected.
The gate refuses at reservation time, before the range becomes delalloc and later
parks at writeback with nowhere to land -- so ENOSPC is clean and there is no
fill-edge parking collapse.
Phase 1 is pessimistic: it gates on bytes_stripe_claimable alone, which errs LOW,
so it can refuse a write that would have landed in a partially-open stripe
(over-refuses by the open remainder, healed by the commit rescan raising claimable
and the FLUSH_DATA ticket retry). A later change adds bytes_stripe_open to the
bound for statfs-exact behavior.
Zygo Blaxell [Tue, 11 Aug 2026 06:53:38 +0000 (02:53 -0400)]
btrfs: raid56: adaptive park deadline from the parked-rbio backlog
Full-stripe batching parks a sub-stripe write's rbio for a deadline so the
writes that fill the rest of its stripe can merge into it, turning a
read-modify-write into one full-stripe write. The deadline is a fixed
per-filesystem value. It is long enough to catch those merges, but at a
small-file fill to ENOSPC -- where a run's stripes never fill because each
file's neighbours land in the next file's stripe rather than this one --
every partial write waits the deadline out, and then its 10x stuck cap, on
an arrival that never comes before padding to a full stripe and going down.
Lowering the deadline globally fixes that fill but throws away the merges
the deadline exists to catch on ordinary moderate writes.
Feed the deadline back from the parking machinery's own backlog instead of
guessing at the workload. Track stripe_parked_now, the number of
currently-parked rbios, incremented as a partial write parks and
decremented as it unparks. When it runs ahead of the stripe_park_congestion
knob (0 disables it, the default), a new async partial write takes the short
sync deadline through the existing sync-park path rather than the full one.
This is negative feedback: the shorter deadline drains the backlog, so once
it falls back below the knob later writes regain the full deadline and full-
stripe batching. No space-state estimate is needed -- a small-file flood
builds the backlog directly, while a large sequential fill (already full
stripes, never parked) and a moderate steady stream do not.
Measured on an eight-device raid5. A small-file balance-reclaim soak that
times out at the default deadline completes at a congestion of 4; on a
throttled moderate stream, where the backlog stays low, a congestion of 32
never trips, keeps the full deadline, and merges three times as much with
38% fewer RMW reads as the same filesystem under a flat 3ms deadline. The
gauge and a congestion_short counter join the stripe_park_stats sysfs file
so the knob can be set from measurement. Off by default, and no data-path
change: a shortened park still pads or reads exactly as it would have, only
sooner.
Data reservations are admitted against arithmetic -- free space minus
trapped fragments minus open-run remainders minus a per-extent margin --
and under sustained near-full churn the arithmetic and the claim rule
disagree for long enough that admitted buffered writes reach writeback
with nothing claimable left: measured, ~5.2-5.5k reserved writebacks
dropped per fsstress churn run, silently for anything not waiting on
fsync. Stock refuses the same write()s up front. Nothing between
"durable by fsync" and "refused by write()" is acceptable when an
operator accident fills the disk.
First step, accounting only: measure the constraint instead of deriving
it. bg->stripe_claimable counts bytes of fully free whole stripes --
exactly what btrfs_claim_free_stripe_run() can take, the complement of
stripe_unusable within each stripe. The commit rescan derives it from
the same pass that computes trapped bytes (free minus trapped) and is
the sole upward correction; incremental maintenance under
ctl->tree_lock only ever DEBITS -- removals round their decrement OUT
to every touched stripe, claims subtract exactly what they took. The
counter can therefore only under-count between commits, never
over-count.
Crediting freed whole stripes incrementally on the add side is
deliberately not done, having been tried and dropped. Several add
paths re-add free space that a low-level remove never de-credited --
the async discard trim (unlink_free_space / bitmap_clear_bits, then
do_trimming's re-add through __btrfs_add_free_space) and
btrfs_remove_free_space's middle-split tail re-add -- so crediting on
add double-counts and drives the counter ABOVE the authoritative scan.
That is the dangerous direction: once admission gates on this counter,
an over-count admits reservations against phantom supply that writeback
then drops, while an under-count is an early, clean write()-time
ENOSPC. Debit-only makes over-counting structurally impossible,
whatever a future re-add path forgets to de-credit. (Reproduced with
compress+autodefrag+discard=async on a legacy-converted raid5
filesystem, incremental ~= 2x scanned; credit_return attribution
confirmed the phantom entered through do_trimming's re-add, not the
open-stripe allocator returns.)
A WARN_RATELIMIT at the rescan catches the dangerous direction anyway
(incremental above scanned), which under a debit-only rule means a
missed consumption site, and localizes it; the clamp to the scanned
value keeps every rescan authoritative regardless. Rate limited rather
than _ONCE because such a gap recurs on every commit, and reporting
only the first hit hides that it is ongoing.
The space_info aggregate bytes_stripe_claimable follows the
stripe_unusable pattern (incremental between commits, re-totaled from
armed groups at the rescan), shows in the ENOSPC dump and in sysfs.
No admission change yet; that comes once the counter proves accurate
under the fill, churn, balance and reclaim suites. The by-size
fast-fail in the claim keeps its early exit: the point of measuring is
to make such inputs trustworthy, not to search harder around them.
Data block groups only for now; raid56 metadata and mixed block groups
join when the data counter has settled.
Zygo Blaxell [Sun, 9 Aug 2026 03:14:23 +0000 (23:14 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: track per-sector liveness and pad from the map
Padding used to ask where the run's allocation frontier was, which
cannot see an allocation abandoned below it -- a reservation released, an
allocation the finder discarded, an extent freed before its write was
ever issued. Runs now carry a bit per sector, set at allocation and
cleared by the new btrfs_open_stripe_write_abandoned() report, and
padding fills exactly the sectors that are dead: this replaces
btrfs_stripe_run_pad_start() with btrfs_stripe_run_pad_mask(). The map
is sized once, with headroom for frontier growth, because the growth
path holds the run lock where nothing may sleep; a run that would
outgrow its map stops growing instead. A closed run's final stripe
overhangs its shrunk end by construction, and those sectors -- the
returned tail, unclaimable while the stripe holds live data -- are dead
and paddable too.
The abandonment report is what closes a writeback ENOSPC race the
fsync-heavy near-full workload hits: an allocation undone without a
report left phantom inflight bytes and phantom-live sectors, and
reservations admitted against that state failed at writeback
(cow_file_range -28) where stock refuses the write() up front. With
the report in place the same workload shows zero writeback failures at
every reservation margin setting, including margin disabled.
Claiming also learns an O(1) fast fail: the by-size index walk is
extracted into find_free_stripe_run(), stopping at the first entry whose
largest contiguous free run cannot hold a full stripe -- near-full, where
free space degenerates into many sub-stripe holes, this replaces a scan
of the whole tree on every allocation.
Moved out of the stripe_meta patch, which needs all of this for tree
blocks but introduced it tangled with the metadata machinery; data wants
it on its own.
Zygo Blaxell [Sat, 8 Aug 2026 15:27:36 +0000 (11:27 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: complete parked writes on allocation coverage, not clocks
A parked partial-stripe write goes down its RMW path when its deadline
expires or a retirement flush kicks it, even when every byte it is
missing below the run's frontier belongs to an allocation whose data IO
is already in flight -- allocation happens at writeback submission, and
the commit's retirement drain waits for exactly those arrivals. Timing
out such a park buys nothing and costs a stripe read plus a second write
of the same stripe: measured on an 8-device raid5 buffered fill, the
100ms deadline turns ~2200 parked stripes per 2GB into read-modify-
writes (pad_decline_live), and stretching the clock 20x recovers only
14% -- the clock is the wrong instrument.
Replace the clock with a coverage test. A parked rbio is ready when its
gathered bios cover everything the covering run has allocated inside its
stripe (btrfs_stripe_run_alloc_ceiling); the remainder lies at or past
the frontier, so the existing pad turns it into a single full-stripe
write with no read phase. Merges check readiness as they land, the park
timer holds unready parks instead of expiring them, and run-retirement
flushes leave unready parks parked: the retirement has already closed
the run (freezing the allocated prefix) and its drain waits on the very
arrivals that will complete them. Waiter-driven flushes (fsync's
pre-writeback kick, ordered-extent waits) and sync parks keep today's
forced behaviour: a blocked waiter's latency beats a saved stripe read.
A stuck cap (10x the park deadline) bounds the wait when an arrival can
never come: a writeback error abandoned the allocation, or the stripe
was already written once by a forced sync park. Such parks are forced
down the old path and counted.
New sysfs stripe_park_stats counters: unparked_ready (parks completed by
the coverage test) and stuck (parks forced at the cap).
Zygo Blaxell [Sat, 8 Aug 2026 07:57:22 +0000 (03:57 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: trace why padding declined, at the moment it declined
The counters say how often padding refused and broadly why, but not what
the run looked like when it happened, and reconstructing that from the
extent tree afterwards cannot distinguish "the stripe was already
allocated when this write arrived" from "it was allocated shortly after".
Those want different fixes, so record the decision where it is made.
Also count the second refusal, which had no counter at all: the oracle can
allow padding and the sector walk still refuse, because a sector below the
frontier is not covered by this write. That is the case where another
allocation shares the stripe and its data is not in this rbio -- a
different thing from the oracle finding the whole stripe allocated.
The tracepoint carries the stripe, how much of it this write covers, the
refusal reason, and the run's start/end/frontier/inflight, so a trace says
directly whether the frontier had already run past the stripe when the
write showed up.
Zygo Blaxell [Sat, 8 Aug 2026 06:03:40 +0000 (02:03 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: tunable park deadlines, and say why padding declined
The deadline constants are meant to be judged "from measurements rather
than taste", but they are compile-time, so every data point costs a kernel
build and a reboot. Measuring a buffered fill -- dd, no fsync, so nothing
kicks the park and the backstop is the only exit -- found 1861 of 3984
parks expiring at the 100ms deadline, which is precisely the no-waiter case
the constant exists for and the one with no numbers behind it.
Expose both deadlines as writable sysfs files, clamped to 60s because a
parked rbio holds its stripe lock, with 0 disabling parking for that class
(useful as an experiment in itself):
Add the counters the stats file cannot supply. rmw_reads counts only
parked writes that still had to read, so it cannot answer "does this
workload read-modify-write at all"; data_rmw counts every data RMW, which
with allow_rmw empty on a covered block group is the number the
stripe-exclusive claim is about, and it should be zero.
And record why padding refused, because the reasons are different defects:
the rest of the stripe is allocated and its data has not arrived yet
(wait longer, or kick when the frontier advances); no open run covers the
stripe, so the run closed before its own write went down; or the frontier
never reached the stripe at all. Attributing them turns "some RMW
remains" into a specific thing to fix.
Zygo Blaxell [Wed, 5 Aug 2026 22:15:06 +0000 (18:15 -0400)]
btrfs: raid56: say whether a metadata read-modify-write is a write hole
meta_rmw counts sub-stripe metadata writes, which is a proxy for exposure
rather than a measurement of it. A stripe modified in place is only a write
hole if it holds data some completed transaction is relying on; a stripe
that two writes of the *same* transaction happen to split costs an extra
read but risks nothing, because a tear loses that whole transaction anyway.
The counter cannot tell those apart, so it cannot answer the only question
that matters.
The rbio can. A read-modify-write has already read every column the write
does not cover, so at the point of the report it is holding the stripe's
on-disk contents. Walk the uncovered tree block positions and read their
headers: a block whose bytenr and fsid match belongs there, and its
generation says which transaction put it there. Compare that against the
generation of the blocks this write is carrying, taken from the same rbio,
so a transaction committing concurrently cannot skew the verdict:
meta_rmw_cur the same transaction's own blocks -- a cost
meta_rmw_old an earlier transaction's -- a write hole
meta_rmw_free no tree block there at all
System block groups are classified too, not just metadata ones. A system
chunk carries no METADATA bit, so a flags test excludes it, but it holds
the chunk tree: the same tree block header, the same generation field, and
a worse consequence if a degraded crash tears it, since without the chunk
tree no logical address can be mapped at all. meta_rmw already counted
system chunks; only the classification skipped them, so their read-modify-
writes were visible as a rate and never as a verdict. Whether a raid56
system chunk ever rewrites parity over a committed tree block is therefore
an open question that this answers by measurement rather than by reasoning
about how the chunk tree is laid out.
This trusts nothing the allocator says about itself. The stripe runs, the
liveness map and the drain accounting are all bookkeeping that could be
wrong in the same way twice; the header in the sector is what a degraded
read would actually have to reconstruct.
On a 3-device raid5 filesystem with raid5 metadata, 6000 small files with
periodic syncs and then a third rewritten, plain stripe_alloc reports 249
sub-stripe metadata writes of which 174 rewrite parity over committed tree
blocks. Adding stripe_meta leaves 37 sub-stripe writes and none of them.
Zygo Blaxell [Tue, 4 Aug 2026 19:51:54 +0000 (15:51 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: report read-modify-write of uncovered stripes
The mount-time warning says which block groups stripe_alloc does not
cover. It cannot say whether anything is actually landing there, and on
a filesystem with raid56 metadata that is the interesting question: every
sub-stripe write to an uncovered stripe is a write hole window, where
parity and data reach the disk separately and a crash in between leaves
the stripe unreconstructible.
Report it from the one place that knows the write is going out as a
read-modify-write rather than as a full or padded stripe. Rate limited,
because a raid56-metadata filesystem does this continuously and the point
is to make the exposure visible rather than to fill the log, and paired
with a meta_rmw counter in the existing stripe_park_stats sysfs file so
the rate can be read off without grepping dmesg.
Silent when stripe_alloc is off: there the whole filesystem works this
way and the user has asked for nothing else.
Zygo Blaxell [Tue, 4 Aug 2026 06:43:20 +0000 (02:43 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: warn at mount when raid56 metadata is not covered
stripe_alloc closes the write hole for raid56 data. It does nothing for
raid56 metadata, which keeps read-modify-write and keeps the hole, and
on a mixed-block-group filesystem it now does nothing at all. A user
who mounts -o stripe_alloc on -d raid5 -m raid5 has every reason to
believe the filesystem is covered, and finds out otherwise only after a
crash on a degraded array -- with metadata damage, which is worse than
the data damage they were protecting against.
Say it once at mount, after the block groups are read, so the message
reflects what is actually on disk rather than what was asked for. A
warning, not an error: the data guarantee is real and worth having on
its own, and a filesystem can be converted to raid1c3/raid1c4 metadata
without unmounting.
Zygo Blaxell [Fri, 7 Aug 2026 01:35:56 +0000 (21:35 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: claim fully-free stripes that span free space entries
The claim fast path searches single entries, so a fully-free full
stripe whose free space spans an entry boundary -- an extent entry
adjoining a bitmap, or two neighbouring bitmap windows -- was
unclaimable. stripe_unusable accounting is entry-blind and counts
exactly those stripes as claimable, so admission reserves data against
them; at writeback the claim finds nothing, cow_file_range() gets
-ENOSPC, and the already-dirtied pages are dropped. full_stripe_len
is not a power of two, so stripe boundaries drift through the fixed
128M bitmap windows and a straddling stripe is a certainty near full,
not a corner case.
Observed live at the raid6 fill edge (rolling-failure, then isolated
by fill-edge-debug with enospc_debug): two 384K stripes, each
straddling a bitmap window boundary, held the space_info accounting
786432 bytes above what the claim could reach, and every writeback
allocation against that phantom margin failed -ENOSPC while ~991MB of
genuinely trapped free space sat in the cache. The reservation margin
cannot absorb this: the gap is per straddling stripe, not per
outstanding extent.
Add an entry-blind slow path: one offset-ordered walk accumulating
contiguous free coverage across entry boundaries, and a piecewise
removal that runs in the same tree_lock critical section as the find,
so a racing claimer cannot see a half-removed run. The fast path is
unchanged and still serves the common case; the slow path runs only
after it fails, which is the near-full case where a stranded stripe
matters most.
Zygo Blaxell [Mon, 3 Aug 2026 07:22:52 +0000 (03:22 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: pessimistic data reservation margin
A byte-counted data reservation holds no collateral against the stripe
claim rule. Between admission at write() time and the allocation at
writeback, the trapped-space picture keeps moving: commits close open
stripe runs and trap their sub-stripe tails, and free space returning
mid-transaction (unpinned deletions, same-transaction frees, drained
run tails, freed reservations) lands in the free space cache as
fragments the claim rule can never hand out but that no counter yet
reflects. The counters were honest at every instant for NEW
admissions while OLD admissions were left holding air; delalloc
writeback gets no second chance, so the pages were dropped. Measured
at the fill edge: ~19 MiB of orphaned bytes_may_use with accounting
and allocator in perfect agreement, and in a later round the admitted
may_use+margin exactly equaled the phantom mid-transaction fragments.
Be pessimistic at reservation time and optimistic at allocation time,
the same shape metadata reservations already use:
- bytes_stripe_margin: one full stripe width (fs_info->
stripe_margin_unit, the widest raid56 data full stripe) per
outstanding delalloc extent, charged and released inside
btrfs_mod_outstanding_extents() so it stays exact across delalloc
merges and splits -- including async compression, where the io-tree
split hook grows the margin to one stripe per compressed piece,
matching the true worst case. Counted in btrfs_space_info_used()
so it holds back admissions. The margin exists only for in-flight
dirty data; steady-state capacity and statfs are untouched.
- Admission probes len + margin through the ticketed FLUSH_DATA path
(then immediately re-releases the probe, which the delalloc hooks
re-charge), so a writer that cannot be covered waits for the
flusher -- commits convert pinned deletions into claimable whole
stripes -- and receives an honest ENOSPC at write(2) if flushing
cannot produce cover.
- Every btrfs_add_free_space() into an armed group counts the added
range's sub-stripe head and tail fragments as trapped immediately;
whole stripes fully inside the range are trivially fully free and
stay claimable. A bounded overcount in the safe direction, never
an undercount; the commit rescan remains the authority and
reconciles (and now grants tickets when it lowers the counter,
since admission waiters may be blocked on exactly that headroom).
This closes the retire-to-rescan window the previous patch left
open, and closes it in the one place every returning range passes
through: counting at the individual close/drain call sites instead
misses paths (the drain returns have two) and gets the arithmetic
wrong (round_up() on the non-power-of-two 448K stripe width).
- When a margin-backed data allocation must split across free space
fragments, every non-final piece is kept a whole-stripe multiple
(rounddown; the width is not a power of two), so at most one piece
per delalloc extent can strand a tail -- the margin pre-paid
exactly one.
- A data writeback allocation returning ENOSPC anyway is loudly
warned: the margin should make it impossible, and the pages are
dropped.
With this, the fill-to-ENOSPC harness goes fully clean for the first
time: zero writeback drops, zero warnings, zero allocation failures,
margin drains to zero at idle, and fill capacity is unchanged. A
writeback ENOSPC retry loop that this replaces is dropped entirely.
Known bounds, accepted: compressed writes are probed one unit per
128M range but charged per 128K piece (probe optimistic, charge
honest); direct IO is probed but carries no margin (its reserve-to-
allocate window is one syscall); a remount toggling stripe_alloc
with dirty delalloc drains the counter (charges are gated on the
mount option, releases are not, and the counter clamps at zero).
Zygo Blaxell [Sun, 2 Aug 2026 07:35:36 +0000 (03:35 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: count open stripe run remainders against data reservations
Close the remaining reservation-vs-allocation windows the commit-time
stripe_unusable rescan cannot see:
- bytes_stripe_open (new): the sum of open runs' unallocated
remainders, maintained per block group under stripe_run_lock at
every open/alloc/grow/close, synced into the space_info after each
mutation, and counted in btrfs_space_info_used(). Claimed bytes are
invisible to the free space cache and will either be allocated or
become trapped tails at close, so reservations must not be admitted
against them.
A closed run's returned tail is still only counted as trapped by the
commit-time rescan, so reservations can race the retire-to-rescan window
inside a commit and be admitted against freshly trapped tails. The next
patch closes that window from the free space cache side, where every
returning range is seen and no call site can be missed.
Measured on the fill-to-ENOSPC rolling test before this change (with
only the bytes_stripe_unusable accounting): tree 'b' still lost 3.3%
(8532 blocks) and tree 'c' 30% (62371 blocks) to silent writeback
allocation failure as trapping compounded.
btrfs: raid56: skip parking for sync rbios finished by their unplug batch
Parking exists to widen the merge window, and for plugged submissions
the unplug callback is the natural end of that window from the
submitter's side: once raid_unplug() has sorted and merged the batch,
nothing more is coming from it. A sync rbio parked after that point --
a sync(2) or WB_SYNC_ALL sweep, whose whole flush shares one plug --
has a waiter behind it and can only sit out the sync deadline. Mark
rbios leaving an unplug batch and let sync ones skip parking.
Unplugged sync submissions (the fsync flush) still park: their sibling
bios arrive one by one and merge into the parked rbio, and the fsync
path kicks it as soon as they have all been submitted, so parking there
is the merge mechanism and the deadline already never fires.
/sys/fs/btrfs/<uuid>/stripe_park_stats reports lifetime counters for
the parking machinery: rbios parked, bytes merged into parked rbios,
and how each park ended (filled to a full stripe, kicked by a waiter or
a settle/retire flush, or expired at its deadline), plus how many
flushed writes were padded to full stripes versus still needing the
RMW read phase. The filled/kicked/expired split shows directly whether
the deadlines are sized right for a given system -- expired parks that
later reappear as rmw_reads are the batching the window failed to
capture -- so any future retuning (or an adaptive deadline) can argue
from measurements instead of taste.
btrfs: raid56: do not park sync writes into nocow runs
An in-place overwrite of a nodatacow file under stripe_alloc parked
like any partial write, but with a waiter behind it and nothing worth
merging: in-place overwrites arrive one fsync at a time, and unlike
the datacow fsync path nothing kicks the parked rbio before the page
writeback wait, so every fsync ate the full sync park deadline.
Measured against stock nodatacow on the same rig, that deadline was
the bulk of a ~3.7ms per-fsync regression. Skip parking for sync
writes whose stripe belongs to a NOCOW-class run; async writeback
still parks and merges there.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: persist nocow runs across commits and remounts
A nodatacow inode's private stripe run used to close at every
transaction commit like all runs, so a slowly appended nocow file burned
a fresh stripe per commit -- and after a remount its partial stripe's
free tail was abandoned outright. Neither cost buys anything: the run
machinery's commit-time closing exists for invariant I2, and a nocow
stripe holds only the owner's write-hole-waived data, so there is
nothing for I2 to protect.
Keep NOCOW-class runs open across commits: the commit-time retirement
and its drain predicate skip them (their extents insert without the
window-sequence deferral, which is fine -- the data is on disk when the
ordered extent finishes, and later same-stripe writes can tear only the
owner's own data). They still close on forced quiescing (read-only,
removal, unmount) and now on the owning inode's eviction, so a cached
but idle inode cannot pin a claimed tail forever.
Across remounts, re-adopt instead: when a nocow allocation's hint
points into a partial stripe that the committed extent tree proves is
wholly owned by the allocating inode, claim exactly the stripe's free
tail (a new exact-range claim that verifies every byte is free before
removing; nothing else can consume free space inside a partially used
stripe, so verify-then-remove cannot race) and continue the run at the
old frontier. Appends to a nocow file then pack sequentially through
commits, evictions and remounts alike.
The re-adoption lookup must not block. It runs from
btrfs_alloc_from_inode_stripe_run(), i.e. inside find_free_extent(),
which holds space_info->groups_sem for read, and stripe_extents_owned_by()
does a full btrfs_search_slot() on the extent tree. The reverse order is
longstanding upstream -- delayed ref processing holds extent tree locks
and then calls find_free_extent(), which takes groups_sem -- so waiting
here closes a cycle. Both sides only take groups_sem for read, which is
not enough: it is an rw_semaphore and block group creation and removal
take it for write, so a writer queued between the two readers blocks the
second one. The check cannot be hoisted above the lock, since it is a
question about the specific stripe the allocator has just settled on, but
it does not have to block: it is read-only and advisory, and every caller
already treats "not provably ours" as a reason to decline the
optimisation rather than as a fact about the extents. So set path->nowait
for the groups_sem caller and let -EAGAIN fall into the existing error
paths; the cost on contention is a re-adoption that does not happen.
btrfs_stripe_nocow_writable() keeps the blocking search -- it runs from
the nocow check with no groups_sem held, and a spurious "not ours" there
would force COW on an extent that does not need it.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: allow-rmw policy, and write-in-place for isolated nocow extents
Re-enable write-in-place for nodatacow files and preallocated extents
under stripe-exclusive allocation, with the understood caveat that the
write hole cannot be prevented for data that opts out of COW: an
in-place write RMWs its stripe's parity, so a degraded crash can tear
the stripe. What CAN be guaranteed is the blast radius: in-place is
permitted only for extents whose full stripes are isolated to the
writing inode, so such a crash can tear only the writing file's own
data -- the nodatacow contract, no worse.
The gate is per extent, decided where nocow eligibility is already
checked: fast path, the stripe belongs to one of the inode's own
NOCOW-class runs (which only ever held its extents); slow path, the
committed extent tree proves sole ownership (single plain data ref,
count 1, matching root and objectid; anything shared, foreign or
metadata fails). The fully-free claim rule keeps uncommitted foreign
extents out of partially used stripes, so the committed tree is
authoritative. Extents that fail -- anything allocated before stripe
isolation existed, extents shared through reflink or snapshots,
relocated extents -- simply stay force-COWed, and because their rewrite
is steered into the inode's private NOCOW run, the next overwrite of
the same data passes: legacy nocow files migrate themselves to
isolation in one COW generation, with no tool and no flag day.
Log-commit settling skips NOCOW-class runs: nodatacow data gets no
fsync survival guarantee (its own later in-place writes can always
tear it), so closing the run would trap its tail for nothing. The
write-hole debug checker skips groups that hosted NOCOW-class runs,
like relocation-used groups, since isolated in-place writes land in
stripes whose runs have drained.
The interface is a word-list policy naming the cases in which
stripe_alloc may permit the legacy unsafe RMW, each independently:
nodatacow in-place writes for nodatacow files' extents
prealloc in-place writes into preallocated extents
fsync waive the close-at-log-commit guarantee: no settling, no
per-inode LOG steering, no carry-forward; logged stripes
may be extended and RMWed as before those patches
It is "allow_rmw", not "allow_overwrite": the fsync case overwrites
nothing, but all three permit read-modify-write of stripes that a
degraded crash can then tear. The nodatacow and prealloc cases require
the per-extent stripe isolation above (the blast radius stays confined
to the writing file); fsync restores the 3a-era exposure where a
degraded crash may cost just-fsynced data, detectably, in exchange for
none of the log-commit costs.
The policy is persistent as the btrfs.stripe_alloc_allow_rmw property
on the top-level root directory, following stripe_alloc's precedent
(applied when the root inode loads during mount, before any user IO),
with a mount option of the same name as a non-persistent override; the
effective policy is their union. Words are separated by comma, space
or colon -- the mount option form must use colon, since mount splits
options at commas. Everything defaults off: plain stripe_alloc keeps
forcing COW and keeps the full fsync guarantee.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: isolate nodatacow and preallocated extents by stripe
Preallocated extents and nodatacow files' extents are candidates for
write-in-place, which reintroduces the raid56 write hole for every
stripe such a write touches: the RMW recomputes parity that also covers
whatever else shares the stripe. Before write-in-place can be
re-enabled for them (a later change; stripe_alloc still forces COW
today), their placement must guarantee the blast radius: such an extent
must never share a stripe with any other file's data.
Steer them into private per-inode stripe runs of a new NOCOW class,
reusing the log-active inode machinery: runs owned by one inode, never
in the shared band slots, found by owner-and-class lookup. Successive
allocations of the same file pack sequentially into the file's own
stripes; different files, and the datacow/relocation/log classes, never
share a stripe with them. A preallocation signals itself through a new
btrfs_reserve_extent() parameter; nodatacow files are recognized by the
inode flag. Placement remains best effort: when no fully-free stripes
are left for a private run the allocation falls back to the shared
runs, which is safe -- an extent that lands in a shared stripe simply
stays force-COWed when write-in-place arrives.
btrfs: raid56: pad sub-stripe writes to full stripes in open runs
A sub-stripe write does a full RMW: read every untouched data sector of
the stripe, recompute parity, write. Under stripe-exclusive allocation
the read phase is usually pointless: a stripe covered by a live stripe
run has never been written at or past the run's allocation frontier, so
the sectors being read contain nothing.
When every data sector the rbio does not cover lies at or past the
frontier, zero-fill those sectors instead of reading them and write
them out with the stripe -- the zeros must reach the disk, or the
parity (computed over them) would not match what scrub reads back. The
partial write becomes one full-stripe write: no read phase, one parity
pass. A frontier that grows during the attempt is safe: the newer
allocation's write serializes behind this rbio's stripe lock and lands
over the zeros. If any uncovered sector is below the frontier (already
allocated to someone else), fall back to the normal RMW.
Together with kicking parked rbios before the fast fsync's writeback
wait, this removes both stalls the raid56 layer added to fsync under
stripe_alloc: the park deadline and the RMW read round trip.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: kick parked rbios before the fast fsync's writeback wait
The fast fsync path waits for page writeback, which completes only when
the raid56 layer writes the data -- but a partial-stripe rbio parks to
collect merges until its sync deadline, and on this path nothing unparks
it before the wait: the stripes are settled only later, in the logging
itself. The full-sync path does not have this problem because the
ordered extent wait already flushes parked rbios before sleeping.
All of the fsync's writes are submitted before the wait, so nothing more
can merge into its stripes; flush the parked rbios covering the attached
ordered extents instead of sleeping out their deadline. Removes the
sync park timeout from the fast fsync critical path.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: carry an inode's log tail forward at fsync
Closing a log-active inode's private stripe run at each log commit
traps the run's final partial stripe tail every time the inode fsyncs:
a steady fsync stream burns one stripe per log commit until the stripes
free or balance runs.
Reclaim the tails by carrying the partial stripe's live data forward.
At each log commit, the settling walk now computes the closed run's
final partial stripe, and the logging paths record the file ranges of
the logged extents that live inside it on a small per-inode table
(bounded; overflow just means an extent is not carried). At the
inode's next fsync, before its delalloc flush, each recorded range that
still maps to the recorded disk bytenr is re-dirtied, defrag style
(reserve, reset delalloc state, mark the folios dirty; absent folios
are read back, which is a plain read of settled data). The flush then
COWs the carried ranges together with the new data into the inode's
current private run, and the old partial stripe empties and frees
whole.
Everything downstream is the ordinary COW pipeline: new extent maps,
ordered extents, checksums, file extent items and delayed refs, and
the log's modified-extents snapshot -- taken inside btrfs_log_inode
after the flush -- picks up the new addresses by itself. Reflinked
ranges need no special handling: foreign referents keep the old extent
alive in its closed (never again written) stripe, and only the space
reclaim degrades. A range that was rewritten, truncated, punched or
compressed simply fails the mapping check and stays put.
Crash safety does not regress. A carried extent's old copy is dropped
through the normal paths: if it was committed, the free pins until the
transaction commits; if it was logged but never committed, its ADD and
DROP delayed refs cancel in cleanup_ref_head(), which also pins
must_insert_reserved heads -- either way the old blocks cannot be
reallocated before the log that references them is superseded.
The settling walk also learned to report the partial stripe through a
widened btrfs_log_settle_stripes() signature (inode and file range
instead of fs_info); compressed extents pass a zero file length to opt
out of carrying while still settling.
The re-dirty reserves with NO_FLUSH. carry_one_range() takes the folio
locks and the extent range lock before reserving, and a flushing
(ticketed) reservation can sleep in wait_reserve_ticket() until the
flusher makes progress -- but every way forward needs the locks we
hold: FLUSH_DELALLOC has to write back the carried range, which blocks
in __folio_lock() on our locked folio, and a transaction commit (with
flushoncommit) waits for the same writeback. The whole filesystem then
wedges behind the stuck commit. Carrying is best effort by design and
the carried range's data is already durable in its old stripe, so on
ENOSPC just skip the carry and let the old stripe free the slow way.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: private per-inode stripe runs for log-active inodes
Closing the open stripe run covering every logged extent at each log
commit made completed fsyncs crash-safe, but at a placement cost: an
fsync-heavy inode shares the open band runs with every other writer, so
each of its log commits closes a shared run, fragmenting concurrent
write streams and trapping the shared run's tail.
Give log-active inodes their own runs instead. The first fsync of an
inode sets a sticky runtime flag (at btrfs_sync_file entry, before the
fsync flushes its own delalloc, so even that first fsync's allocations
are steered). Datacow allocations for a flagged inode come from a
private LOG-class run: claimed like any run but never placed in the
shared band slots, owned by the inode, and found by owner lookup under
the block group's stripe_run_lock. A per-inode hint seeds the
allocator's search with the run's location; the hint is advisory (a
stale hint costs a lookup miss, never a wrong run, since the owner
match is authoritative). When no fully-free stripes remain for a
private run the allocation falls back to the shared runs, restoring
the previous placement with unchanged safety.
One inode's log commit now settles only its own stripes: other
writers' runs stay open and their streams stay contiguous, and the
only trapped tails are the fsyncing inode's own. Private runs also
give each log-active inode exclusive stripes, which a later change
uses to copy live tails forward and reclaim them without touching
foreign extents.
The commit-time retirement closed runs by walking the band slots,
which private runs never occupy; walk the block group's run list
instead so every open run, slotted or private, is closed and drained
under invariant I2 (no open run survives a transaction commit).
btrfs: stripe_alloc: settle a logged extent's stripes at log commit
Stripe-exclusive allocation bounds degraded-crash damage to the current
transaction, but within that window two log commits can still share a
stripe: fsync 1 writes the head of a stripe, the open run keeps filling
it, and a later write's read-modify-write rewrites the parity that
protects fsync 1's data. A degraded crash during the second write tears
the first -- the write hole's shape, confined to the log window, and the
reason the fsync guarantee has so far been "loss is detectable" rather
than "completed fsyncs survive".
Close it with a case analysis. A logged extent in a full stripe is
already safe: nothing ever writes a full stripe again, since COW never
overwrites and there are no free sectors left to allocate. A logged
extent in a partial stripe is exposed only to future writes into that
stripe's remaining sectors -- so at log commit, close the stripe's open
run (nothing further allocates into it), kick any parked partial writes
for it, and wait for its in-flight data IO before the log super is
written. This is the log-window analogue of invariant I2, which the
commit-time retirement provides for full commits. Both log paths are
hooked: the fast path per extent map in log_one_extent(), and the
full-sync path where copy_items() walks new data extents (old-transaction
extents are skipped there, and are exactly the ones already settled by
their own commit).
The drain is bounded and join-free: run inflight is counted from
allocation, which happens during writeback with submission following in
the same pass, so the wait is bio flight time plus the parked-write
deadline that the flush short-circuits; write_done reporting needs no
transaction join, so waiting under the inode log mutex and a running
transaction handle is safe.
The cost is spatial: every fsync that logs an extent in a partial stripe
retires that stripe early, trapping its unwritten tail like any other
partially filled stripe until it frees or balance reclaims it.
Fsync-heavy workloads therefore burn a stripe tail per touched stripe
per fsync; the follow-up per-inode log runs and copy-forward relocation
exist to reclaim exactly that cost, and are optimizations on top of the
guarantee this patch completes.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: control the policy with a filesystem property
A mount option is an awkward fit for write-hole protection: it occupies
a mount-option bit, and protection silently lapses whenever the option
is forgotten -- an fstab edit, a rescue mount, a recovery boot -- which
is exactly when a degraded raid56 is most likely to be written.
Control the policy with a "stripe_alloc" filesystem property instead,
following the property system's compression precedent: a btrfs.
namespace xattr, user-visible and admin-controlled, on the top-level
subvolume's root directory. Set it once (setfattr -n btrfs.stripe_alloc
-v 1, or btrfs property once btrfs-progs learns the name) and it is
persistent: the kernel applies it when the root directory inode loads
its properties during mount, before any user IO. Deleting the xattr
disables the policy; open runs drain at the next commit's retirement,
which runs unconditionally. Stray copies of the xattr -- a received or
cloned subvolume -- are ignored: only the top-level root carries the
policy, so receiving a stream from a stripe_alloc filesystem cannot
flip the policy on the destination.
The support checks (free space tree, not zoned, no remap-tree, not
mixed block groups) are enforced both when the property is set and when
it is applied at mount. The mixed block group test matters most here.
btrfs_check_mountopts() refuses mixed for the mount option, and without
the same test this would be a second way in that skips it -- enabling a
policy the series does not support there, after the block group read
that would have warned about uncovered metadata has already run, so the
user is told the filesystem is protected and it is not.
This stays within the series' no-on-disk-format-change constraint, and
that is the compatibility story: an older kernel mounts the filesystem
read-write and simply uses the legacy allocator, which is fully
compatible because the on-disk layout is unchanged. New kernels honor
the property during the feature's long-tail testing period; if no use
case surfaces where stripe-exclusive allocation is worse than the write
hole it protects against, it can eventually become the only allocation
mode and the property a no-op.
Known old-kernel interactions with the btrfs. namespace: existing
kernels list and read the xattr (the btrfs. get path is a plain xattr
read) but refuse to set or remove unknown property names, so the flag
can only be managed from a kernel that knows it. btrfs-progs
interaction (check, property list) with an unrecognized property is a
userspace compatibility item to verify and, if needed, patch.
The mount option is kept for now as a non-persistent override. Later
protection stages with different risk profiles (the log-tree
full-stripe relocation) should be gated by their own property rather
than widening this one, so their testing exposure can be controlled
independently.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: never claim stripes covered by a live run
The range-to-run lookups -- attaching an ordered extent to its stripe run
and reporting completed data IO by bytenr -- assume that at most one run
on a block group's list covers any given address. Nothing enforced that.
A reservation that is discarded before anything references it (the
cow_file_range error path under ENOSPC, the find_free_extent backout
paths) returns its bytes to the free space cache immediately, with no
pinning: there is no committed state to protect. When an ENOSPC failure
storm discards every allocation in a stripe, the stripe is fully free
again and the claim rule -- correctly, by its own lights -- hands it out
as part of a new run while the old run object is still on the list
draining its other stripes' IO. Full-stripe write batching widened a
run's post-close drain from microseconds to the parked-write timeout, and
the soak test hit the overlap within minutes: new allocations' ordered
extents attached to the old run (first match by range), their completions
drained the old run's inflight accounting into an assertion failure, and
the new run's accounting never drained, wedging the commit's retire wait.
The overlap is harmless to data -- a stripe can only be re-claimed if
every byte of it is free, and discarded reservations never issued bios --
but the accounting corruption is fatal.
Freed committed extents cannot reproduce this: they return to the free
cache only in the unpin phase at the tail of a commit, and the same
commit's retirement already drained -- and freed -- every run opened
before it. Only the unpinned immediate-free paths race with a draining
run.
Rather than enumerate those paths, enforce the lookups' assumption at the
claim site: btrfs_claim_free_stripe_run() now trims a candidate to end
before the first live run overlapping it, or rejects it if its head
overlaps. Re-claiming such stripes just waits until the old run drains
off the list, which only comes up inside ENOSPC failure storms.
Reproduced with concurrent fill-to-ENOSPC/delete cycles, balance, and
fsstress on a 4-device raid5: the assertion fired within ~15 minutes
unpatched, and ~10 hours of the same load ran clean with this fix.
btrfs: raid56: batch stripe_alloc partial writes into full-stripe writes
A raid56 sub-stripe write pays a read-modify-write: read the rest of the
stripe, recompute parity, write. The plug callback merges rbios submitted
within one plug window and the stripe cache saves re-reads for
back-to-back writes, but measurement shows what survives them: on a
4-device raid5, small-file writeback produces 100% sub-stripe rbios (zero
full-stripe writes) and a mixed 4K-512K workload ~55%, so parity is
recomputed and rewritten once per file that lands in a stripe.
Stripe-exclusive allocation gives raid56 something the allocator never
guaranteed before: the rest of an open run's stripe is either written
before the run closes -- within the current transaction -- or not at all.
That makes holding a partial write a sound bet, so park it: a partial
write rbio whose stripe belongs to a stripe run keeps the stripe
lock but does not start its RMW. Later writes to the stripe merge into
it through the existing lock_stripe_add() path, and the moment its data
bitmap covers the stripe it is submitted as a single full-stripe write:
one parity computation, no reads.
A draining run counts, not just an open one. A run closes the moment it
is fully allocated -- typically milliseconds before its last writes reach
the raid56 layer -- so gating on "open" would leave exactly those tail
writes unable to park and unable to pad, and they are the bulk of the
read-modify-writes this patch exists to remove. A draining run is in
fact the safest thing to park against: its frontier is frozen, so
everything below it is inflight IO the commit drain already waits for
(arrival guaranteed) and everything above it is dead space the pad may
fill.
Completion accounting can never trigger the flush of runts -- parked bios
have not been submitted, and preallocated or discarded allocations
produce no bios at all -- so liveness comes from explicit flushes: the
run retirement paths flush before the commit's IO drain (which waits on
the very bios parked here), ordered-extent waiters flush their range on a
short retry period, and a timer bounds everything else. Writes with a
blocked waiter (REQ_SYNC: fsync- and sync-driven writeback) park with a
~3ms deadline instead of 100ms -- long enough for the rest of one
writeback pass over the stripe to merge in, short enough to stay
invisible in fsync latency -- and a sync bio merging into a parked rbio
pulls the deadline in. Only the bg->open_stripe slots are consulted for
eligibility, and a parked rbio that a racing retirement closed out from
under is bounded by the timer, never by the drain.
Measured (same 4-device raid5, deterministic workloads, classifying every
write rbio at rmw_rbio):
fsync latency is 12ms vs 8ms unpatched (each fsync pays one short park).
Batching also collapses trapped free space in a mixed-size forward fill
from ~87 MiB to ~3 MiB: stripes now fill completely before the commit
closes their run, so the frontier strands almost nothing.
Validated: btrfs selftests; mixed-size + concurrency + churn + balance
workload with trapped-space accounting returning to zero after deleting
everything; scrub and full sha256 read-back over 4005 mixed random files;
and the dm-log-writes write-hole crash matrix (24/24 controls clean, 0/36
armed cases with committed data damage) -- parking does not perturb the
stripe-exclusivity guarantee it rides on.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: grow the frontier run instead of stranding its tail
When an allocation is larger than every open run's remainder, the
allocator claims fresh fully-free stripes and opens a separate run,
leaving the old run's tail behind. The banded cursors keep that tail
open for a while, but a band collision or the commit eventually closes
it, and the tail -- perfectly usable space that a misfit merely jumped
over -- is stranded in a partially filled stripe. In a forward fill
this happens at every size upshift, and measurement shows it is where
nearly all of stripe_alloc's trapped space comes from: on a mixed-size
fill it strands ~14% of the data written, a figure that band-granularity
tuning moves by at most a tenth and commit frequency does not move at
all.
Grow the frontier run instead. If the freshly claimed stripes directly
follow the end of an open run of the same class, extend that run to
absorb them and place the allocation at the run's old tail, spilling
contiguously into the new stripes. Nothing is stranded, and the extent
is physically contiguous. In a forward fill the by-size claim naturally
returns the stripes adjacent to the frontier, so the single frontier run
just keeps growing -- the allocator packs the way the stock allocator
does, while keeping stripe exclusivity: the grown stripes were claimed
fully free, the run still closes at the next commit and is never
reopened, so every stripe of the run is filled within one open-run
lifetime. A grown run keeps its open_seq; it can only still be in a
band slot if the retire walk for its window has not yet run, which the
open_stripe_lock nesting at the claim site excludes from racing.
Measured on a 4-device raid5 with a deterministic interleaved 4K-512K
fill (trapped space via the stripe_unusable counter, byte-identical data
both sides): 111.1 MiB trapped without growing, 7.2 MiB with -- a 94%
reduction, and usable capacity at ENOSPC within 0.5% of the stock
allocator (1561 vs 1569 MiB, vs 1421 MiB without growing). The benefit
survives churn: with age-correlated deletion the grown runs' contiguous
packing lets whole stripes free together, and steady-state usable
capacity stays at 1486-1561 MiB versus 1284-1421 MiB without growing
across correlated and adversarial small-file deletion patterns. Data
integrity verified by scrub and full sha256 read-back over mixed
random-content files, and trapped-space accounting still returns to
zero when all files are deleted.
The open-stripe selftest is updated: the misfit allocation now grows the
run and lands at the run's old tail, spanning the stripe boundary, and
the relocation-class case doubles as a check that a claim adjacent to
another class's run never grows it.
btrfs: stripe_alloc: keep an open run per size band to trap less
A single open stripe run per class forces every allocation that does not
fit the current run's remainder to close that run -- trapping its
unallocated tail in a now partially filled stripe -- and claim a fresh
fully-free stripe. A workload that interleaves small and large extents
(the common case) therefore strands a tail on every size change, even
though a later small allocation could have filled it.
Keep one open run per power-of-two band of remaining free space instead
(band k holds a run with remaining in [2^k, 2^(k+1)) sectors), per class.
An allocation takes the run in the smallest band that still fits --
segregated best fit -- so a small write lands in an already-open, nearly
full stripe rather than opening a new one, while a large write that no
open run can hold opens a fresh stripe and leaves the smaller runs open
for the small writes that do fit them. After each allocation the run is
re-placed into the band its new remainder falls in; when two runs collide
in a band the fuller one is kept -- it can serve larger future
allocations, and closing it would trap more -- and the other is closed,
its tail returned to the free space cache.
16 bands cover a full stripe of up to 2^16 sectors, far more than any
raid56 geometry (nr_data_stripes * stripe_len / sectorsize is 158 sectors
at 10 data stripes and a 64K stripe). Commit-time retirement and the
read-only / removal paths now walk every band of every class; only the
bg->open_stripe[][] slots can ever hold an open run, so one pass still
suffices, and the obsolete single-slot assertions are dropped.
This does not touch the write-hole guarantee: every run is still a
contiguous fill of fully-free stripes, closed at commit and never
reopened. It only changes which open run an allocation joins, reducing
the free space trapped in partial stripes -- and thus stripe_unusable --
for mixed-size workloads.
The open-stripe selftest is rewritten to the multi-cursor contract: a
misfit allocation now keeps the old run open (its tail is not returned to
the cache) and a later small allocation backfills it, so fewer stripes are
claimed before the free space is exhausted.
btrfs: account stripe_alloc trapped free space for honest statfs
Free space in the partially filled stripes of a stripe_alloc (raid56
write-hole-safe) block group is real free space -- it is in the free
space tree and cache -- but the stripe-exclusive allocator cannot hand it
out until the whole stripe frees. statfs therefore over-reports available
space, promising free space that a later allocation refuses with ENOSPC.
Track this trapped space per block group as stripe_unusable, summed into
space_info->bytes_stripe_unusable. It is derived, so there is no on-disk
format change and the free space tree and cache are left untouched
(preserving the extent-tree/free-space-tree consistency btrfs check
verifies).
stripe_unusable is defined by a scan that accumulates every free byte of
the block group into a per-stripe array and then sums the stripes that are
partially filled. A per-stripe accumulator, rather than a streaming sweep
or a per-stripe cache search, is what makes the result correct regardless
of the order the free space cache yields its ranges -- an offset-sorted
bitmap entry can emit runs that lie past a following extent entry, so the
ranges are not globally monotonic -- and regardless of whether free space
is stored as extents or bitmaps. A debug-build assertion checks that the
scan distributes exactly the cache's free space. Because trapped space
only settles at commit -- when the retire path returns partially filled
stripes and deleted extents are unpinned -- the scan is recomputed at
commit for groups whose free space changed (flagged cheaply on the
allocation and free paths), which suits the timescale of the reclaim it
feeds far better than a running per-extent tally. The space_info total is
recomputed as the sum of the armed groups after those rescans, so it
cannot drift.
statfs subtracts bytes_stripe_unusable from the data f_bavail so df
reports what can actually be allocated, and the counter is exposed at
/sys/fs/btrfs/<uuid>/allocation/data/bytes_stripe_unusable. It is
deliberately not part of btrfs_space_info_used(), so the reservation layer
is unchanged and this carries no ENOSPC-behaviour risk.
The counter is armed once a group's free space cache is loaded, so a group
contributes zero until then and statfs starts optimistic and settles to
honest as groups cache and commit. It is disarmed when a group turns
read-only (its free space is then accounted as read-only and already
excluded from statfs) and re-armed by a rescan on the way back to
read-write, so a balance both recovers trapped space and updates the
counter. A CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG-only sysfs trigger, stripe_unusable_rescan,
forces a full recompute for auditing the accounting.
Two deliberate imprecisions, matching existing behaviour rather than
bettering it: statfs subtracts bytes_stripe_unusable but not
bytes_zone_unusable, so stripe_alloc df reports availability before reclaim
while zoned df reports it after; and superblock stripes, permanently
unusable in every profile, are left to the existing bytes_super accounting
rather than separately reported here. Both await a maintainer decision on
a common convention.
Zygo Blaxell [Wed, 5 Aug 2026 03:33:32 +0000 (23:33 -0400)]
btrfs: stripe_alloc: refuse space_cache=v1
The v1 free space cache inode is nodatacow, preallocated and nodatasum,
so the cache is overwritten in place during commit: a sub-stripe write
into a data block group, landing in whatever committed stripes the cache
occupies, with no csum that could reveal the damage afterwards. That is
precisely the write this series exists to prevent.
The free space tree is not what stripe_alloc needs -- nothing in it reads
the tree, and the by-size index it allocates from is the in-memory free
space, which exists whatever the on-disk format is. Having no cache at
all is fine too. Only v1 has to be kept away, so say that instead of
demanding v2.
Three places, because the cache format can only be converted at mount and
never at remount, so the option alone is not the whole story:
- btrfs_check_mountopts() rejects space_cache=v1 with stripe_alloc.
- btrfs_reconfigure() rewrites the cache options after that validation,
to restore what is on disk. It has to, given the above. Re-check
afterwards rather than assume the options still mean what they did.
- block group read time refuses to mount when v1 cache inodes are
present on disk at all. cache_generation only records whether the
last mount wrote the cache; the inodes are the durable evidence, so
btrfs_free_space_cache_v1_present() looks for one under
BTRFS_FREE_SPACE_OBJECTID in the tree root. Clearing them is one
mount away, and the error message says so.
cache_save_setup() also declines to set the cache up while stripe_alloc
is on. The checks above should make that unreachable, but it is the
point where the in-place write would actually be issued.
btrfs: add a write-hole invariant checker to the raid56 write path
With stripe-exclusive allocation, a raid56 data stripe may only be
written while an open or draining stripe run covers it: after its run
retires and drains at a transaction commit, nothing may ever write to
it again, and a write outside any run means an allocation bypassed the
policy. Both cases are the write hole about to happen.
Check the invariant (under CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG) for every raid56 write
operation, full-stripe and sub-stripe alike, at rmw_rbio() time. This
turns every upstream violation -- a missed allocation path, a
retirement ordering bug, an accounting leak -- into a deterministic
WARN at the moment of the offending write, instead of silent damage
that needs a crash plus a device failure plus a scrub to observe. The
bios gathered in an rbio have not reported their IO done yet, so their
runs cannot drain under the check: no false positives from completion
races.
Block groups that ever hosted relocation-class runs are skipped
(sticky, debug-only flag): relocation legitimately overwrites its
preallocated extents in place after their runs drain, and the write
path cannot tell those writes from violations.
btrfs: retire stripe runs at commit and gate stripe_alloc
Hook stripe run retirement into the transaction commit, right after
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING stops accepting joins with a single writer
left. At that point every data extent the transaction references was
inserted by an ordered extent completion that joined earlier, implying
its own data IO is done; the retirement drain waits out in-flight
neighbour writes in the same stripes (a pure data-IO wait, never an
ordered extent wait, which would deadlock on the blocked join). After
the drain, no stripe this transaction references can ever be written
again, so a crash after the superblock write cannot tear it -- closing
the raid56 write hole for stripe-allocated block groups without
requiring flushoncommit. A defensive retirement in
btrfs_free_block_groups() covers the transaction abort path.
An ordered extent whose stripe run was opened after the committing
transaction's retire point cannot insert its file extent into that
transaction, so btrfs_finish_one_ordered() ends its handle and waits
for the commit's critical section to end. That wait must not be taken
under the range's extent lock: buffered writers block on the locked
range in lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() while holding their
prepared, locked folios, which stops the writeback flusher and
kcompactd behind those folios, which stops reclaim -- and the
committing transaction is itself draining data bios whose submission
path can need memory (dm-crypt bounce pages on the host where this was
caught). Drop the extent lock and the FINISHING_ORDERED tag before the
wait and re-take them before re-joining, preserving the
extent-lock-before-join ordering. The window is safe: the range is
still covered by the pending ordered extent, so a writer that takes the
lock finds it, releases its folios and waits -- which is exactly what
unbinds writeback and reclaim.
Force COW for in-place writes that would land in raid56 data block
groups while stripe_alloc is enabled (nodatacow files and writes into
preallocated extents): a single in-place write could tear a stripe
containing other files' committed extents, making the guarantee
conditional on the whole filesystem's usage. The check sits in
can_nocow_file_extent(), covering buffered and direct IO with one
choke point, and applies per extent so nocow to non-raid56 profiles
keeps working. The data relocation inode is exempt: its extents live
in relocation-class stripe runs that never share stripes with other
data, and relocation depends on in-place writes.
Validate the option at mount: it requires the free space tree (the v1
space cache overwrites its data in place during commit), and is
refused with the remap-tree feature (whose relocation writes bypass
the ordered extent accounting) and on zoned filesystems (which have
their own allocator and no write hole).
Mixed data+metadata filesystems are refused too. The immediate symptom
is a hang: a run drains when it is closed and its inflight_bytes reach
zero, and the only things that subtract are ordered extent completion, a
discarded allocation and a freed reservation. Metadata has no ordered
extent -- btrfs_alloc_tree_block() allocates with is_data false and
end_bbio_meta_write() reports nothing back to the run -- so a metadata
allocation raises inflight_bytes and nothing ever lowers it, the run
never drains, and btrfs_retire_open_stripes() waits for a completion
that has no code path to arrive from. The hung task detector stays
quiet, because wait_var_event() sleeps in a state it exempts; the
filesystem just stops. Reproduced deterministically on
mkfs.btrfs -M -d raid5 -m raid5 mounted -o stripe_alloc: the first sync
after a few hundred small files never returns.
That symptom is not why the refusal is permanent: a later patch
(stripe_meta) gives metadata its own completion report, and the drain
then terminates. These are why:
- raid56 deliberately skips csum lookup for mixed block groups, to
avoid recursing into a metadata read while holding the full stripe
lock (see the comment above the map_type test in fill_data_csums()).
That test reads the block group's flags, so in a mixed group it
cannot tell a data stripe from a metadata stripe and disables
verification for every one of them. Stripe-exclusive allocation
could keep the two apart -- allocation classes already never share a
run, so never a stripe -- but nothing durable records which class a
stripe held, and asking the extent tree while holding the full stripe
lock is the recursion the test exists to avoid. The recovery paths
here assume a rebuilt data sector can be checked; in a mixed group it
cannot.
- Data and metadata draw on one space_info and one free space pool.
Data reservations carry a pessimistic whole-stripe margin, metadata
reservations carry none, and a metadata claim that finds no fully
free full stripe returns ENOSPC -- which for metadata aborts the
transaction rather than failing one write. A data fill can starve
metadata into an abort, which separate block groups cannot do.
Mixed block groups are a mkfs-time property of small filesystems, where
raid56 is least appropriate and stripe_alloc's trapped space costs
proportionally most, and the option cannot become applicable later. So
do not carry a half-supported mode.
btrfs_is_stripe_alloc_bg() therefore requires DATA without METADATA as
belt and braces for a block group that somehow reaches the allocator
anyway, and moves out of extent-tree.c's file scope so block-group.c
can share the one copy of the rule. (Metadata and system block groups
never carried the DATA flag, so they were already excluded.)
btrfs: report stripe run data IO through the ordered extent lifecycle
Pair every byte reserved from an open stripe run with exactly one
"write done" report, so commit-time retirement can wait for all data IO
into a window's stripes:
- Ordered extents get a stripe_run pointer, attached at creation by a
range lookup (cheap: gated on the fs having any stripe runs at all,
and a run's block group membership is established before its
allocation returns, so the gate cannot miss). NOCOW and PREALLOC
ordered extents write into previously allocated extents, which can
never lie inside a run claimed from fully-free stripes, and are
skipped. The report fires once at IO completion (the IO_DONE moment
in can_finish_ordered_extent(), before any transaction join, so the
commit-time drain can never deadlock on a blocked join), with a
catch-all when an ordered extent is freed without completing IO.
- Reservations freed without an ordered extent ever owning them (error
paths) report through btrfs_free_reserved_extent(); the one caller
that frees a range an ordered extent did own (the finish-error path)
uses btrfs_free_reserved_extent_ordered() to avoid double reporting.
- Preallocated extents never issue data IO and report at insertion;
this also covers relocation's data inode preallocations.
btrfs: add the stripe_alloc allocation policy for raid56 data
Wire the open stripe run allocator into find_free_extent() as a per-
block-group policy: with the new stripe_alloc mount option, allocations
from raid56 data block groups go through btrfs_alloc_from_open_stripe()
instead of the clustered allocator, and only ever land in fully-free,
stripe-aligned runs. Since the loop's terminal LOOP_NO_EMPTY_SIZE
degradation only applies to the clustered path and stripe block groups
ignore empty_size/empty_cluster, the natural terminal behaviour is:
no fully-free stripe in any block group -> allocate a chunk -> ENOSPC.
The availability hint feeds max_extent_size so callers retry with
smaller allocations instead of failing early.
Stripe runs get an allocation class: relocation overwrites its
preallocated extents in place, so its allocations must never share a
stripe with ordinary cow data. Classes never share a run, and one
block group at a time is softly dedicated to relocation by reusing
fs_info->data_reloc_bg (btrfs_clear_data_reloc_bg() moves from zoned
code to generic code for this; the class tag, not the dedication, is
what carries correctness). The dedication is dropped when relocation
finishes or the dedicated group runs out of stripes.
Setting a block group read-only now retires its stripe runs (in
btrfs_inc_block_group_ro(), covering scrub, relocation and unused
block group deletion), pairing with the allocator's ->ro check under
the stripe_run_lock so no run can survive into or be created in a
read-only group.
btrfs: add open stripe run tracking for stripe-exclusive allocation
Add the in-memory state and lifecycle for "open stripe runs", the
allocation windows of the raid56 stripe-exclusive allocation policy. A
run is a contiguous stripe-aligned region claimed whole from the free
space cache via btrfs_claim_free_stripe_run() and filled strictly
sequentially by btrfs_alloc_from_open_stripe(). A run closes when it is
exhausted, when an allocation does not fit its remainder, or when the
transaction commit retires it; closed runs are never reopened and their
unallocated tails return to the free space cache, where the fully-free
claim rule makes them unallocatable until the whole stripe frees. This
is what will guarantee that a full stripe only receives writes within
one commit window, closing the raid56 write hole for these block groups.
Each run counts reserved bytes whose data IO has not completed yet,
maintained under the block group lock and reported back through
btrfs_open_stripe_write_done(). btrfs_retire_open_stripes() implements
commit-time retirement: bump the retire sequence, close every run opened
before it, and wait for their inflight bytes to drain. It is a pure
data-IO wait, deliberately not an ordered extent wait: it is designed to
run after the committing transaction stops accepting joins
(TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING with a single writer), where waiting for
ordered extent completion would deadlock on the blocked transaction
join, and where every extent the transaction references already has its
own data on disk. Allocations racing with the commit open runs stamped
with a newer sequence and are neither retired nor waited for; their
extents can only be referenced by the next transaction. Block groups
with runs are tracked on an fs_info list whose membership is
established before an allocation returns, which is what lets the retire
walk rely on the sequence stamp.
Exercised by a new sanity self-test; the raid56 stripe allocation
policy and the commit hook will be the first non-test users.
btrfs: add btrfs_claim_free_stripe_run() for stripe-exclusive allocation
Add a free space cache primitive that finds and removes a contiguous,
fully-free, stripe-aligned run of full stripes from a block group. This
is the building block for a raid56 allocation policy that never issues
sub-stripe writes into stripes containing committed data, closing the
raid56 write hole for datacow writes: because a partially-filled stripe
can never satisfy the fully-free requirement, stripes retired at commit
time become unallocatable without any persistent allocator state.
The search walks the by-size free space index (largest max contiguous
free run first) rather than the by-offset tree: an entry whose largest
contiguous free run is smaller than a full stripe cannot contain a
fully-free stripe, and every following entry is no larger, so the search
stops at the first such entry. Near-full, where the free space
degenerates into many sub-stripe holes, that is an O(1) fast fail
instead of a scan of the whole free space tree on every allocation --
the dominant cost of the known raid56 near-full allocation slowdown.
Full stripe geometry is relative to the block group start and supports
non-power-of-two stripe widths. Unaligned head and tail remainders are
returned to the free space cache with their trim state preserved. Runs
are found within a single free space entry; a fully-free stripe split
across an extent entry and a bitmap neighbour is deliberately not found,
which errs toward missing a claimable stripe, never toward claiming a
non-free byte.
The function is exercised by new sanity self-tests covering aligned and
capped claims, partial-stripe exclusion, head/tail carving, block-group-
relative geometry, bitmap entries, and non-power-of-two stripe widths.
The raid56 stripe allocation policy will be its first non-test user.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net> Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com> Tested-by: Barry K. Nathan <barryn@pobox.com> Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net> Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There is a new build failure with MT7996E=m MT76_CORE=y and NET_AIROHA_NPU=m:
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: airoha_npu_get
ld.lld: error: undefined symbol: airoha_npu_put
>>> referenced by npu.c
>>> drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/npu.o:(mt76_npu_init) in archive vmlinux.a
Fix this by reworking the dependency for the MT7996_NPU to only
allow enabling that when mt76_core can link against the npu driver.
To make sure this gets caught more easily in the future when additional
mt76 variants need the same dependency, also turn CONFIG_MT76_NPU into
a tristate symbol that has the same dependency.
Fixes: 7fb554b1b623 ("wifi: mt76: Introduce the NPU generic layer") Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612201519.4054683-1-arnd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 7a8c994cbb2d ("ACPI: processor: idle: Optimize ACPI idle
driver registration") moved the ACPI idle driver registration to
acpi_processor_driver_init(), but it didn't check whether a cpuidle
driver was already registered.
For example, on Intel platforms, if the intel_idle driver is already
loaded, the code would still evaluate the _CST object in the ACPI
table and attempt to register the acpi_idle driver. This registration
would fail with -EBUSY due to the existing check in cpuidle_register_driver.
Add a check at the beginning of acpi_processor_register_idle_driver()
to avoid unnecessary _CST evaluate and potential registration failures.
Fixes: 7a8c994cbb2d ("ACPI: processor: idle: Optimize ACPI idle driver registration") Signed-off-by: Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608190359.3254-1-TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The function acpi_processor_cstate_first_run_checks() is currently called
only once during initialization in acpi_processor_register_idle_driver().
Since its execution is already limited by the caller's lifecycle, the
internal static 'first_run' variable is redundant and can be safely
removed.
Additionally, the current function name is no longer descriptive of its
behavior, so rename the function to acpi_processor_update_max_cstate()
to better reflect its actual purpose.
Signed-off-by: Huisong Li <lihuisong@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260311065038.4151558-4-lihuisong@huawei.com
[ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 66c62e6773c5 ("ACPI: processor: Add cpuidle driver check in acpi_processor_register_idle_driver()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The function acpi_processor_cstate_first_run_checks() is responsible
for updating max_cstate and performing initial hardware validation.
Currently, this function is invoked within acpi_processor_power_init().
However, the initialization flow already ensures this is called during
acpi_processor_register_idle_driver(). Therefore, the call in
acpi_processor_power_init() is redundant and effectively performs no work,
so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Huisong Li <lihuisong@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260311065038.4151558-2-lihuisong@huawei.com
[ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Stable-dep-of: 66c62e6773c5 ("ACPI: processor: Add cpuidle driver check in acpi_processor_register_idle_driver()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Writing the current "dynamic_epp" state to sysfs fails with -EINVAL even
though the desired result was achieved. Allow writes to "dynamic_epp"
that does not modify the state.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508051748.10484-4-kprateek.nayak@amd.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
If "dynamic_epp" is disabled, the driver initialization and the default
EPP selection from sysfs currently sets the EPP based on the power
supply state of the system at that time but there is no power supply
callbacks registered to toggle it when the power supply state changes.
This can lead to faster battery drain on platforms that start off while
being plugged to the wall but later move to battery power since the EPP
stays at AMD_CPPC_EPP_PERFORMANCE.
Use "epp_default_dc" as the default EPP selection when dynamic_epp is
disabled, restoring older behavior. On servers, this defaults to
AMD_CPPC_EPP_PERFORMANCE and on other platforms, it defaults to
AMD_CPPC_EPP_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508051748.10484-6-kprateek.nayak@amd.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The energy performance preference field of the CPPC request MSR
supports values from 0 to 255, but the strings only offer 4 values.
The other values are useful for tuning the performance of some
workloads.
Add support for writing the raw energy performance preference value
to the sysfs file. If the last value written was an integer then
an integer will be returned. If the last value written was a string
then a string will be returned.
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: caa822d312be ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Use "epp_default_dc" as default when dynamic_epp is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In case a new index is introduced add a static assert to make sure
that strings and values are updated.
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: caa822d312be ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Use "epp_default_dc" as default when dynamic_epp is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Add whitespace around the equals and remove leading space.
Reviewed-by: Gautham R. Shenoy <gautham.shenoy@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: caa822d312be ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Use "epp_default_dc" as default when dynamic_epp is disabled") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Storing of the iw->head entry inside the wait_queue callback, or when
removing a waitid item, really should use proper load/store
acquire/release semantics, and KCSAN correctly warns of that. Ensure
that they do so.
Use it everywhere that the wait_queue_entry is removed from the head,
and be a bit more cautious in zeroing out iw->head whenever the entry is
removed from the list.
The fq change path accepts TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in [1, INT_MAX] and
TCA_FQ_INITIAL_QUANTUM up to INT_MAX, while fq_init() already clamps to
[1, 1<<20]. A user can override the init clamp via tc qdisc change,
restoring the small-quantum deficit spin that the init clamp prevents.
Narrow iq_range.max to 1<<20 so TCA_FQ_INITIAL_QUANTUM is rejected at
parse time. Clamp TCA_FQ_QUANTUM to [256, 1<<20] in fq_change() and
fq_init() quantum to [256, 1<<20] for tiny-MTU devices.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ=y. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (namespace-local via
unshare -Urn suffices).
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 root fq
tc qdisc change dev dummy0 root fq quantum 1 stab data 32768 size_log 15 cell_log 0
Fixes: 709f34f7c28d ("net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum") Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/QDISC-0CFC.v3.20260901204856@mojatatu.com.2 Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
When USB support is disabled, the array is not referenced anywhere,
causing a warning:
drivers/bluetooth/btmtk.c:35:3: error: 'btmtk_mt6639_devs' defined but not used [-Werror=unused-const-variable=]
35 | } btmtk_mt6639_devs[] = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Move it into the #ifdef block.
Fixes: 28b7c5a6db74 ("Bluetooth: btmtk: Add MT6639 (MT7927) Bluetooth support") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Devmem tcp tx doesn't work without zero-copy, however it's not currently
enforced if NETIF_F_SG isn't present. In this case, tcp_sendmsg_locked()
will try the copy path and try to copy data from an iovec which consists
of offsets into the dma-buf and would normally fail. Moreover, d9c56501c72fd ("net: tcp: block mixing readable and unreadable frags")
relies on that and assumes that the devmem binding is present IFF we're
using the zero-copy path, which can be used to mix net-iov and pages in
a single skb, and break invariants. Let's reject devmem tx without
zero-copy.
Note, the parameter check the patch is modifying is too loose, we can
create an io_uring request with dmabuf_id and all ZC flags, but which
won't have the binding. We replace it with stricter validation.
Fixes: bd61848900bff ("net: devmem: Implement TX path") Fixes: d9c56501c72fd ("net: tcp: block mixing readable and unreadable frags") Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fdc2478d8f21268d7078556409887d8e6ba0ad32.1788529053.git.asml.silence@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Commit a5242d37c83a ("erofs: error out obviously illegal extents in
advance") changed the per-extent algorithm presence check from "is the
bit set" to "is the only bit set":
- !(sbi->available_compr_algs & (1 << map->m_algorithmformat))
+ (sbi->available_compr_algs ^ BIT(map->m_algorithmformat))
`available_compr_algs` is a bitmap of every compression algorithm
available in the image (z_erofs_parse_cfgs() iterates it with
for_each_set_bit()), so an image that enables more than one algorithm
has multiple bits set. XOR is zero only when the bitmap is exactly
BIT(map->m_algorithmformat); for any image with two or more algorithms
the test is non-zero for every extent and the read fails with
-EFSCORRUPTED ("inconsistent algorithmtype %u").
Reproducer (mkfs.erofs from erofs-utils 1.7.1):
$ mkdir src
$ yes A | head -c 100K > src/a
$ head -c 64K /dev/zero > src/b
$ mkfs.erofs -zlz4:deflate multi.erofs src
$ mount -t erofs -o loop multi.erofs /mnt
$ cat /mnt/a >/dev/null
cat: /mnt/a: Structure needs cleaning
$ dmesg | tail
erofs (device loop0): inconsistent algorithmtype 0 for nid 46
erofs (device loop0): read error -117 @ 0 of nid 46
The erofs on-disk format (Z_EROFS_COMPRESSION_MAX = 4 with LZ4, LZMA,
DEFLATE, ZSTD) and the kernel parser explicitly support
multi-algorithm images, and erofs-utils 1.7.1 generates them via the
"-z X:Y" syntax.
If the tail data can be inlined into the inode meta block, it should
be converted into a regular tail pcluster.
In principle, it should be converted into an uncompressed pcluster if
there is not enough gain to use compression (map->m_llen < map->m_plen);
but since there are various shipped images, relax the condition for
ztailpacking tail pcluster fallback instead of reporting corruption
incorrectly.
Reported-and-tested-by: Yifan Zhao <zhaoyifan28@huawei.com> Reported-by: Alberto Salvia Novella <es20490446e@gmail.com> Closes: https://github.com/erofs/erofs-utils/issues/51 Fixes: a5242d37c83a ("erofs: error out obviously illegal extents in advance") Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Ensure the dma state is initialized when we're not using the contiguous
iova, otherwise the caller may be using a stale state from a previous
request that could use the coalesed iova allocation.
Fixes: 2f6b2565d43cdb5 ("block: accumulate memory segment gaps per bio") Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The cloned bio needs to inherit the accumulated gaps between vectors so
that we can know if this bio can subscribe to the iova coalescing
optimization.
When cloning for a split, the gap only applies to the front bio since
that's as far as has been processed. The remaining bio can reset its
gaps to 0 since it advanced past the checked vectors, and will start its
accounting from there on the next split check.
Fixes: 2f6b2565d43c ("block: accumulate memory segment gaps per bio") Reported-by: Eric Auger <eauger@redhat.com> Tested-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260819154937.3903312-1-kbusch@meta.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
security/integrity/secure_boot.c contains a single __weak function,
which breaks recordmcount when building with clang:
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" ARCH=powerpc LLVM=1 ppc64_defconfig security/integrity/secure_boot.o
Cannot find symbol for section 2: .text.
security/integrity/secure_boot.o: failed
Introduce a Kconfig symbol, CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_GET_SECUREBOOT, to indicate
that an architecture provides a definition of arch_get_secureboot().
Provide a static inline stub when this symbol is not defined to achieve
the same effect as the __weak function, allowing secure_boot.c to be
removed altogether. Move the s390 definition of arch_get_secureboot()
out of the CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE block to ensure it is always available, as
it does not actually depend on KEXEC_FILE.
subns was renamed inview to better reflect the function of the flag.
Unfortunately the kernel-doc was not properly updated in 2 places.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602020737.vGCZFds1-lkp@intel.com/ Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602021427.PvvDjgyL-lkp@intel.com/ Fixes: 796c146fa6c82 ("apparmor: split xxx_in_ns into its two separate semantic use cases") Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Clang warns (or errors with CONFIG_WERROR=y / W=e):
pinctrl/mediatek/pinctrl-airoha.c:2064:41: error: variable 'an7583_pinctrl_drive_e2_conf' is not needed and will not be emitted [-Werror,-Wunneeded-internal-declaration]
2064 | static const struct airoha_pinctrl_conf an7583_pinctrl_drive_e2_conf[] = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Due to a typo, an7583_pinctrl_drive_e2_conf is only used within
ARRAY_SIZE() (hence no instance of -Wunused-variable), which is
evaluated at compile time, so it will not be needed in the final object
file.
Fix the .confs assignment for AIROHA_PINCTRL_CONFS_DRIVE_E2 in
an7583_pinctrl_match_data to clear up the warning.
Closes: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/2142 Fixes: 3ffeb17a9a27 ("pinctrl: airoha: add support for Airoha AN7583 PINs") Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christian Marangi <ansuelsmth@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The driver start registering a regulator, but can still be
enabled even when it is unable to call into the regulator
subsystem:
aarch64-linux-ld: drivers/phy/renesas/phy-rcar-gen3-usb2.o: in function `rcar_gen3_phy_usb2_probe':
phy-rcar-gen3-usb2.c:(.text+0x2884): undefined reference to `devm_regulator_register'
Add a Kconfig dependency to avoid this configuration.
The recent change for perf c2c annotate broke build without slang
support like below.
builtin-annotate.c: In function 'hists__find_annotations':
builtin-annotate.c:522:73: error: 'NO_ADDR' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean 'NR_ADDR'?
522 | key = hist_entry__tui_annotate(he, evsel, NULL, NO_ADDR);
| ^~~~~~~
| NR_ADDR
builtin-annotate.c:522:73: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
builtin-annotate.c:522:31: error: too many arguments to function 'hist_entry__tui_annotate'
522 | key = hist_entry__tui_annotate(he, evsel, NULL, NO_ADDR);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from util/sort.h:6,
from builtin-annotate.c:28:
util/hist.h:756:19: note: declared here
756 | static inline int hist_entry__tui_annotate(struct hist_entry *he __maybe_unused,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
And I noticed that it missed to update the other side of #ifdef
HAVE_SLANG_SUPPORT. Let's fix it.
Cc: Tianyou Li <tianyou.li@intel.com> Fixes: cd3466cd2639783d ("perf c2c: Add annotation support to perf c2c report") Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mt76_npu_device_active() and mt76_ppe_device_active() read dev->mmio.npu
and dev->mmio.ppe_dev. The mmio, usb and sdio bus structs share a union in
struct mt76_dev, so on USB and SDIO these read unrelated data from the
usb/sdio struct, which is non-NULL in practice.
mt76_npu_device_active() then returns true on USB, and
mt76_rx_poll_complete() takes the offload path and skips
mt76_rx_aggr_reorder(). RX A-MPDU subframes are delivered out of order and
the peer's TCP stack treats that as loss: heavy retransmissions and reduced
throughput in AP mode. Seen on mt7921u, mt7925u, mt76x2u and mt76x0u.
Gate both helpers on mt76_is_mmio() so they only run for the bus type that
owns the mmio union member.
Fixes: 7fb554b1b623 ("wifi: mt76: Introduce the NPU generic layer") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Nick Morrow <morrownr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Devin Wittmayer <lucid_duck@justthetip.ca> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720232640.41293-1-lucid_duck@justthetip.ca Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
s390_reset_system() calls set_prefix(0), which switches back to the
absolute lowcore. At that point the stack protector canary no longer
matches the canary from the lowcore the function was entered with, so
the stack check fails.
Mark s390_reset_system() __no_stack_protector. This is safe here since
its callers (__do_machine_kdump() and __do_machine_kexec()) are
effectively no-return and fall back to disabled_wait() on failure.
EPP 0 is the only supported value in the performance policy.
commit 798c47593cca ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add support for platform profile
class") changed this while adding platform profile support to the
dynamic EPP feature, but this actually wasn't necessary since platform
profile writes disable manual EPP writes.
Restore allowing writing EPP of 0 when in performance mode.
Reviewed-by: Marco Scardovi <scardracs@disroot.org> Tested-by: Marco Scardovi <scardracs@disroot.org> Reported-by: Stuart Meckle <stuartmeckle@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221473 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/upower/power-profiles-daemon/-/work_items/190 Fixes: 798c47593cca ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add support for platform profile class") Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The dynamic EPP feature uses power_supply_reg_notifier() and
power_supply_unreg_notifier() but doesn't declare a dependency on
POWER_SUPPLY, causing linker errors when POWER_SUPPLY is not enabled.
Add POWER_SUPPLY to the selects.
Suggested-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202604040742.ySEdkuAa-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407194949.310114-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
hits the WARN_ON_ONCE() in static_key_disable_cpuslocked() and hangs the
system since both sysfs writes are trying to do
amd_pstate_change_driver_mode() without any synchronization.
Grab the "amd_pstate_driver_lock" mutex when modifying "dynamic_epp" to
prevent the two paths from racing with each other. Add a lockdep
assertion for "amd_pstate_driver_lock" in
amd_pstate_change_driver_mode() to formalize the dependency.
Since "cppc_mode" is stable under "amd_pstate_driver_lock", only reload
the driver when in "AMD_PSTATE_ACTIVE" mode and reject all writes when
in passive or guided mode, or if the driver is not loaded, since only
active mode operates on EPP.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508051748.10484-2-kprateek.nayak@amd.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Failure to allocate profile name will return -EINVAL from
platform_profile_register() while in fact, it is a failure to allocate
memory for the profile_name string.
Return -ENOMEM when kasprintf() fails to allocate profile_name string.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508051748.10484-3-kprateek.nayak@amd.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
An active power supply notifier can race with amd_pstate_epp_cpu_exit()
trying to reset the floor perf and can overwrite the floor perf set in
MSR_AMD_CPPC_REQ.
Unregister the notifier before setting the floor perf to prevent the
rare race.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Reviewed-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com> Signed-off-by: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260508051748.10484-5-kprateek.nayak@amd.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello (AMD) <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
cpufreq_cpu_get() returns NULL when no cpufreq policy is associated with
the requested CPU, for example because the CPU is offline or the policy
has already been torn down. Both amd_pstate_power_supply_notifier() and
amd_pstate_profile_set() acquire a policy via cpufreq_cpu_get() and then
pass that pointer to amd_pstate_get_balanced_epp() and
amd_pstate_set_epp(), which dereference it unconditionally. A racing
CPU hotplug or driver teardown can therefore lead to a NULL pointer
dereference on either of these dynamic EPP paths.
The third cpufreq_cpu_get() caller in this file, amd_pstate_verify(),
already handles the NULL case. Bring the two new callers in line with
that pattern: return NOTIFY_OK from the power-supply notifier (matching
the other "nothing to do" exits) and -ENODEV from amd_pstate_profile_set()
(the usual cpufreq error for a missing CPU policy).
Found by code inspection; not tested on hardware.
Fixes: e30ca6dd5345 ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add dynamic energy performance preference") Fixes: 798c47593cca ("cpufreq/amd-pstate: Add support for platform profile class") Signed-off-by: EDAMAMEX <edame8080@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260520070211.2753183-1-edame8080@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The typec_altmode structure contains a 'struct device' object
that cannot be allocated on the stack because of its size, even
when ignoring the lifetime rules:
If no_console_suspend is specified, on suspend the 8250 console driver
uses a scratch register (UART_SCR) to store a special canary value. This
is used during the resume path to identify a printk() call before the
driver's own ->resume() callback. In this case,
serial8250_console_restore() is called to quickly re-init the 8250 for
console printing.
See commit 4516d50aabed ("serial: 8250: Use canary to restart console after
suspend") for the original motivation.
Unfortunately, this canary workaround does not work in all cases (such as
suspend to mem) because the scratch register will not reset. This has not
been a real issue until now because it could simply lead to some garbage
characters upon resume. However, with the introduction of console flow
control it becomes a real problem because a failed suspend/resume detection
when flow control is enabled leads to all characters hitting the flow
control timeout.
Workaround this issue by temporarily ignoring console flow control when
the debug canary suspend/resume detection is active.
Fixes: 5e6dfb87b191 ("serial: 8250: Add support for console flow control") Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707141032.5074-1-john.ogness@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Every platform driver can be forced to match a device that doesn't match
its list of device IDs because of device_match_driver_override(), so
platform drivers that rely on the existence of a device's ACPI companion
object need to verify its presence.
Accordingly, add a requisite ACPI_COMPANION() check against NULL to the
platform/x86 lg-laptop driver.
Fixes: 2d9cb20610f7 ("platform/x86: lg-laptop: Convert ACPI driver to a platform one") Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3706551.iIbC2pHGDl@rafael.j.wysocki Reviewed-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Ensure the perf.data output when checking permissions is written to
/dev/null so that it isn't left in the directory the test is run.
Fixes: b58261584d2f ("perf test kvm: Add some basic perf kvm test coverage") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The tracing_max_latency shouldn't be limited if CONFIG_FSNOTIFY is defined
or not and it was moved out of that protection to be always available with
CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE. All was moved out except the dentry descriptor
for it (d_max_latency) and it failed to build on some configs.
Move that out of the CONFIG_FSNOTIFY protection too.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260209194631.788bfc85@fedora Fixes: ba73713da50e ("tracing: Clean up use of trace_create_maxlat_file()") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602092133.fTdojd95-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
They are partially incorrect since "software" engine does not mean
hamming, the "none" cae is also falling into this print, and on-die
means there is some kind of hardware support; we prefer to use the
wording on-host vs. on-die.
Since commit 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard
filler with a keyed sector marker"), integrity_metadata computes a
checksum for every discarded block into the "checksums" buffer.
integrity_sector_checksum always writes the whole digest. So if the tag
size is smaller than the digest size, the checksum of the last block
that fits into the buffer is written past the end of it. For example,
with hmac(sha256) and tag size 16, a 4MiB discard writes 16 bytes past
the kmalloc'ed page.
Fix this by subtracting extra_space from the buffer size when computing
max_blocks, like we do for writes.
Fixes: 68c5c42567bc ("dm-integrity: replace forgeable discard filler with a keyed sector marker") Reviewed-by: Jose Fernandez (Anthropic) <jose.fernandez@linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Ben Cressey <ben@cressey.dev> Assisted-by: Claude:unspecified Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
htb_classify() follows each filter-selected inner class by switching
to cl->filter_list, but never bounds the number of hops. A filter on
an inner class can point back to itself or to another inner class that
points back, creating an infinite loop in the packet classification
path with the qdisc lock held and BH disabled — a soft lockup / panic
from a single packet.
Bound the traversal with a hop counter and drop the packet with a
rate-limited warning once the bound is exceeded. The counter is
incremented at the point the inner filter chain is picked up, after the
TC_ACT_* switch has consumed the classifier verdict, so a terminal
TC_ACT_QUEUED/STOLEN/TRAP on the last permitted chain still sets *qerr
to __NET_XMIT_STOLEN and the packet is not charged as a drop by this
qdisc or its parent.
The bound is TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH, taken from HTB's own parameters rather than
from the qdisc hierarchy depth limit. Class levels run from 0 to
TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH - 1, so a traversal that strictly descends in level can
take at most TC_HTB_MAXDEPTH hops. That descent is what a sane
configuration does, but it is assumed here rather than enforced:
htb_find() resolves a classid against every class in the qdisc, so a
filter may equally select a sibling or an ancestor. The normal
root -> inner -> leaf path takes a single hop, so the bound does not
affect legitimate classification.
htb_classify() can now return NULL irrespective of CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT,
whereas previously every NULL return sat inside that ifdef. The NULL
handler in htb_enqueue() therefore cannot stay conditional either, so
drop the ifdef around it. This matches hfsc_enqueue(), which has always
handled a NULL class unconditionally. Without it, a kernel built
without actions would dereference a NULL class instead of dropping.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB, CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32,
CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR.
- Create an HTB qdisc on a device (e.g. lo), add an inner class
1:1 with a leaf child 1:10, install a root u32 filter selecting
1:1, and an inner-class u32 filter on 1:1 also selecting 1:1.
- Send one packet (ping). On the unfixed kernel the classify loop
spins with the qdisc lock held; with softlockup_panic=1 it panics.
- Reachable from unprivileged user via unshare -Urn (CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai> Co-developed-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260826143339.271935-1-victor@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
The retransmit path has no such guard. __tcp_retransmit_skb() builds a
segs > 1 skb and hands it to the GSO layer, which only advances th->seq
per segment and copies urg_ptr verbatim:
/* __tcp_retransmit_skb() */
len = cur_mss * segs; /* segs > 1, no urg_mode check */
...
/* tcp_gso_segment(): bumps seq only, urg_ptr is copied */
urg_ptr is an offset from the segment's own seq, so a copied value points
at a different place on each segment. The receiver rebuilds the absolute
urgent seq as seg.seq + urg_ptr, so it walks a moving urgent point instead
of the one OOB byte:
ATM device ci_range fields (vpi_bits and vci_bits) represent the
number of bits supported for VPI and VCI addressing on the device.
net/atm/common.c directly uses these fields as bit shift counts:
vpi >> dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
vci >> dev->ci_range.vci_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vpi_bits
1 << vcc->dev->ci_range.vci_bits
usbatm_atm_init() sets ci_range.vpi_bits and ci_range.vci_bits to
ATM_CI_MAX (-1), which is defined in <uapi/linux/atmdev.h> as a
sentinel value for userspace ATM_SETCIRANGE requests, not a valid bit
count. Shifting by -1 is undefined behavior and triggers UBSAN
warnings.
ATM UNI cell headers allow up to 8 bits for VPI (0..255) and 16 bits
for VCI (0..65535). Initialize vpi_bits to 8 and vci_bits to 16, as
done by solos-pci.
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